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Summary 
 
Over the past decades an increasing number of companies has used technology 
acquisitions to gain access to new technologies and technical capabilities. Technology 
acquisitions are defined as the acquisition of young technology-based firms made by 
large established firms to graft the acquired technological capabilities onto their own 
resource bases (Puranam et al., 2006). The advantages of taking over such young 
technology-based firms are clear from the perspective of the acquirer. First, they 
provide fast access to valuable assets such as technologies and innovative capabilities 
(Ahuja & Katila, 2001; Ranft & Lord, 2002). Second, young technology-based firms have 
organizational advantages in terms of innovation and exploration, which explains their 
attractiveness for incumbents (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997). Moreover, technology 
acquisitions offer fast access to new markets, while internal development is a more risky 
strategy to enter new markets. Technology acquisitions are not only an important 
strategic objective from the perspective of the acquirer, also for the young technology-
based firm it might be interesting to pursue an acquisition strategy as it offers them 
access to the complementary assets necessary to bring their products to the market 
(Gans & Stern, 2003). Besides, technology acquisitions constitute an essential exit route 
for the venture capitalist investing in the firm. Nowadays, the majority of the financial 
returns realized by venture capitalists are generated by acquisitions (i.e. the so-called 
trade sales). The objective of this doctoral study is to investigate how the three parties 
mentioned above can contribute to the success of the acquisition, taking in account that 
the definition of success might differ depending on the party under study. While the 
acquirer is primarily interested in performance after acquisition, the young technology-
based firm and the venture capitalist are rather interested the acquisition as such and 
the return generated by this event. This dissertation consists of three studies, each 
zooming in on one of those parties involved.  
The first paper of this dissertation studies the acquisition from the perspective of the 
acquirer. More specifically, it investigates how certain strategic decision taken by the 
acquirer influence acquisition performance. Using a case study design, this study 
unravels how the strategic decisions and actions undertaken by the acquirer in the pre- 
and postacquisition stage are interrelated and how they affect acquisition performance. 
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The empirical findings clearly demonstrate how preacquisition and postacquisition are 
closely correlated and influence one another. The interviews further revealed that both 
search and selection are crucial in preparing the implementation of the acquisition, as 
they moderate some of the typical selection problems (such as information asymmetry) 
and implementation problems (such as resistance of the personnel). With respect to 
search, our findings confirm that it is crucial to develop effective search strategies which 
allow the acquirer to identify interesting acquisition target. The search for suitable 
acquisition targets usually occurs by means of engaging in collaboration agreements, 
corporate venture capital, licensing agreements etc. They allow the acquirer to gain in-
depth knowledge about the potential acquisition target before the actual acquisition. 
This knowledge helps the acquirer to better manage both the selection stage and the 
postacquisition implementation stage. Regarding selection, we explored how decisions 
taken during the selection and due diligence process influence the subsequent stages of 
the acquisition. The empirical data indicate that involvement of the client department is 
a crucial success factor in the acquisition process for the following reasons. First, the 
client department is best suited to check a number of assumptions with respect to the 
expected synergies. Second, the involvement of client department during the pre-
acquisition stages also secures buy-in and commitment from this department to 
acquisition, thereby reducing the resistance of the employees to the acquisition and 
facilitating implementation. Finally, we discovered that the interrelatedness of these 
process components has implications for the team that is managing the acquisition. In 
particular, the interviews revealed that acquisitions might benefit from project 
management, where one dedicated team is responsible for the management of the file.   
In a second paper, attention shifted from the acquirer to the young technology-based 
firm. This study aims to investigate how the strategic actions of the young technology-
based firm contribute to the chance of being acquired and the acquisition return. 
Building on resource-based theory, a number of hypotheses were developed to predict 
the impact of technical, human and social resources on acquisition likelihood on the one 
hand and the impact of revenue generating capabilities on acquisition return on the 
other. Based upon an analysis of 285 young technology-based firms, it appears that 
hiring managers with experience in the sector and patenting both have a positive 
influence on the likelihood of being acquired. Regarding acquisition return, both 
revenues and commercial and research partnerships have a positive impact on 
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acquisition return. Conversely, hiring experienced top  manager and patents seem to 
negatively affect acquisition return.  
The third study finally, intends to examine to what extend the experience of the venture 
capital firm investing in the young technology-based company influences the likelihood 
of realizing an acquisition. For the development of the hypotheses, organizational 
learning theory was used. This theory distinguishes between three types of learning: 
learning from own experiences, learning from the experiences of others and congenital 
experience (i.e. experience which already accrued in the industry before foundation of 
an organization). The analysis of 206 British young technology-based firms reveals that 
both experiential learning from own trade sale experience and vicarious learning from 
the trade sale experiences of the syndicate partners have a significant positive impact on 
the likelihood of realizing a trade sale. Congenital experience on the other hand has no 
significant impact.  
These three studies make a number of significant contributions to the literature. The 
first paper primarily contributes to the literature on technology acquisitions. This 
papers is one of the first to investigate how the preacquisition stage and postacquisition 
are related to one another. Further, this paper illustrates the importance of proper 
knowledge management, not only between target and acquirer but also between the 
various teams within the acquirer. The second and third paper primarily contribute to 
the exit literature by explicitly considering trade sales an exit option. Furthermore, the 
second paper also adds to the entrepreneurship literature on commercialization 
strategy by focusing on acquisitions as a route to market. In addition to the literature 
contributions, this doctoral thesis also provides some interesting insights for acquirers, 
young technology-based firms and venture capitalists looking to realize a successful 
acquisition.   
 14 
 
 
  
 15 
 
Samenvatting 
 
De voorbije decennia namen steeds meer ondernemingen hun toevlucht tot 
technologieacquisities voor het verwerven van nieuwe technologieën en capaciteiten. 
Technologieacquisities worden gedefinieerd als de overname van jonge 
hoogtechnologische bedrijven met het oog op het verwerven van technologische 
capaciteiten (Puranam et al., 2006). De motieven voor overname zijn duidelijk vanuit het 
standpunt van de overnemer: dit type van overnames bezorgt hen immers snelle 
toegang tot waardevolle activa zoals technologieën en innovatiecapaciteiten (Ahuja & 
Katila, 2001; Ranft & Lord, 2002). Kleine hoogtechnologische bedrijven beschikken 
typisch over een organisatorisch voordeel op vlak van innovatie en exploratie, wat hen 
zo aantrekkelijk maakt in de ogen van de grote bedrijven (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997). 
Bovendien laat een overname een snellere betreding van de markt toe dan wanneer de 
overnemer voor het risicovolle traject van interne onderzoek en ontwikkeling zou 
kiezen (Hitt et al., 1991). Dergelijke overnames zijn niet alleen interessant vanuit het 
oogpunt van de overnemer, ook voor de hoogtechnologische bedrijfjes zelf is dit een 
belangrijk strategisch doel. Een overname biedt hen immers de toegang tot de 
complementaire middelen (zoals productie, marketing & distributie) nodig om hun 
product naar de markt te brengen (Gans & Stern, 2003). Bovendien is een overname 
vaak een belangrijke exit voor de risicokapitaalverschaffers die in het bedrijf 
geïnvesteerd hebben. De meerderheid van de financiële returns gerealiseerd door 
venture capitalists komt immers voort uit de verkoop van hun portfoliobedrijven aan 
grotere bedrijven. Doel van dit doctoraat is om na te gaan hoe de drie bovengenoemde 
partijen kunnen bijdragen tot het succes van de overname. Dit doctoraat bestaat dan ook 
uit drie afzonderlijke studies die elk inzoomen op één van de bovengenoemde partijen 
en nagaan in welke mate de strategische acties en karakteristieken van deze drie 
partijen bijdragen tot het succes van de overname. Hierbij wordt rekening gehouden 
met feit dat elke partij succes en performantie anders zal gaan definiëren. Daar waar de 
overnemer voornamelijk geïnteresseerd zal zijn in performantie na de overname (i.e. in 
welke mate worden de verwachte synergiën gecreëerd), zijn de overlater en venture 
capitalist eerder geïnteresseerd in de financiële gevolgen van de deal zelf. Voornaamste 
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doelstellingen voor deze partijen zijn enerzijds het realiseren van een overname tout 
court en anderzijds de prijs waarvoor men verkoopt.  
De eerste studie die deel uitmaakt van dit doctoraat bestudeert de overname vanuit het 
perspectief van de overnemer. Deze studie gaat na hoe bepaalde acties ondernomen 
door de overnemer bijdragen tot beter overnamesucces. Door middel van een case 
studie werd onderzocht in hoeverre de beslissingen en acties ondernomen door de 
ondernemer in preacquisitie overnamefase een invloed hebben op postacquisitie 
implementatie. De resultaten van deze studie tonen aan dat het voor de overnemer 
belangrijk is om preacquisitie en postacquisitie te zien als twee gecorreleerde processen 
die in hoge mate door elkaar beïnvloed worden in plaats van twee duidelijk gescheiden 
processen. Uit de case studie komen twee belangrijke bevindingen naar voren. Enerzijds 
blijkt dat het voor de overnemer cruciaal is om effectieve zoekstrategieën te 
ontwikkelen die hem in staat stellen interessante overnamekandidaten te detecteren. 
Deze zoektocht naar geschikte overnamedoelen kan gebeuren door middel van het 
aangaan van samenwerkingsverbanden, corporate venture capital, het sluiten van 
licentieovereenkomsten etc. Deze zoekstrategieën laten de ondernemer toe een goede 
kennis op te bouwen van het overnamedoel alvorens over te gaan tot effectieve 
overname. Deze kennis zal ook nuttig zijn in de postacquisitiefase en bijdragen tot een 
vlottere implementatie. Anderzijds blijkt uit de resultaten dat het aan te raden is om het 
departement dat verantwoordelijk zal zijn voor de implementatie reeds te betrekken 
van in de selectiefase. Op die manier kan de kennis van dit departement aangewend 
worden voor het juister inschatten van de verwachte synergiën. Tevens draagt dit bij tot 
een groter gevoel van commitment en buy-in aan de zijde van het 
implementatiedepartement. De grote mate van interactie tussen de preacquisitie en 
postacquisitie fase heeft verder voor gevolg dat voldoende aandacht besteed moet 
worden aan de uitwisseling van informatie en kennis tussen de partijen betrokken in 
pre- en postacquisitie.  
 
In een tweede studie verschoof de aandacht van de overnemer naar de overlater. Deze 
studie heeft als doel na te gaan in welke mate de strategische acties ondernomen door 
het jonge hoogtechnologische bedrijf bijdragen tot de kans om overgenomen te worden 
en de return gerealiseerd met de overname. Hierbij werd verder gebouwd op de 
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“resource-based theory” om een aantal hypotheses te ontwikkelen omtrent de invloed 
van deze middelen op de kans een overname te realiseren en de return van de 
overname. Uit de analyses blijkt dat het aanwerven van managers met ervaring in de 
sector en het verkrijgen van patenten beide bijdragen tot een hogere overnamekans. 
Voor wat betreft de return bij overname, stellen we vast dat zowel de omzet als het 
aangaan van commerciële en onderzoekssamenwerkingsverbanden leiden tot hogere 
overnamereturns, terwijl patenten en ervaren topmanagers een negatieve invloed 
hebben op overnamepremie.  
 
De derde studie tot slot heeft als doel om te onderzoeken in welke mate de ervaring van 
de venture capitalist die investeerde in de hoogtechnologische starter een invloed heeft 
op de kans een overname te realiseren. Voor het ontwikkelen van de hypotheses werd 
vertrokken van de “organizational learning theory”. Deze theorie maakt het onderscheid 
tussen drie vormen van leren: leren uit eigen ervaringen, leren uit de ervaringen van 
anderen en aangeboren ervaring (i.e. ervaring die reeds was opgebouwd in de industrie 
voor de opstart van de organisatie). Uit het onderzoek van 206 Britse 
hoogtechnologische starters en hun venture capitalists blijkt dat voornamelijk het leren 
uit eigen ervaringen en het leren uit de ervaringen van andere venture capitalists een 
positieve impact had op de kans dat het portfolio bedrijf een overname kon realiseren. 
De aangeboren ervaring had geen significante impact.  
 
Deze drie studies maken een aantal contributies tot de bestaande literatuur rond dit 
onderwerp. De eerste studie draagt bij tot de literatuur rond technologieacquisities door 
de onderlinge afhankelijkheid van preacquisitie en postacquisitiefase aan te tonen. 
Verder illustreert deze studie het belang van kennismanagement, niet alleen tussen 
overnemer en overlater maar ook tussen de verschillende partijen werkzaam bij de 
overnemer. De tweede en derde studie dragen voornamelijk bij tot de exit literatuur. 
Daar waar deze literatuur voornamelijk focuste op IPOs, gaan deze twee studies dieper 
in op het belang van overnames. Verder draagt de tweede studie ook bij tot de 
ondernemerschapsliteratuur. Hoewel in deze literatuur veel aandacht besteed wordt 
aan commercialisering van de technologie op de technologiemarkt, focust deze 
 18 
 
literatuur zich voornamelijk op samenwerkingsverbanden als een manier om de 
technologie te commercialiseren. De optie van een overname wordt hier vaak 
genegeerd. Tot slot genereerde deze doctoraatsstudie een aantal nuttige inzichten voor 
de praktijk. Zowel de overnemer als de overlater en venture capitalists verkrijgen via 
deze studie een duidelijker inzicht in de factoren die bijdragen tot een succesvolle 
overname.  
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1. Introduction 
Over the past decades, our economy has evolved to a knowledge economy. Although 
knowledge has always characterised our economic systems, what distinguishes today’s 
knowledge economy from ancient economies is the increasing role of knowledge as a 
commonly traded good (Arora, Fosfuri & Gambardella, 2002). This resulted in the 
emergence of so-called markets for technology. According to  Arora et al. (2002) a 
market for technology refers to transactions for the use, diffusion, and creation of 
technology. This includes transactions involving full technology packages and patenting 
licensing as well as transactions involving knowledge that is not patentable or not 
patented. The existence of markets for technology has importance implications for the 
corporate strategy of the firm. This doctoral dissertation explores one modus to operate 
on the market for technology, namely technology acquisitions. Technology acquisitions 
are defined as “the acquisition of young-technology-based firms made by large 
established firms to graft the acquired technological capabilities onto their own 
resource bases”.  Technology acquisitions not only have become increasingly important 
for incumbents, but also for high-tech start-ups as a commercialization strategy 
providing access to the complementary assets necessary to bring their products to the 
market. This study aims to investigate the implications for strategy when pursuing 
technology acquisitions. 
 
1.1. Importance of technology acquisitions 
The increasing importance of technology acquisitions implies that incumbents become 
more and more dependent on accessing the exploration capabilities of high-tech start-
ups to foster innovations. There are various motives that incite incumbents to acquire 
technology ventures. First, the knowledge and technologies gained through external 
mechanisms will be less path-dependent and may therefore lead to a greater variance of 
resource combinations and better innovation performance (Fleming, 2001; Levinthal & 
March, 1993; Nelson & Winter, 1982). Second, the acquisition of profound expertise and 
technical skills constitutes a central motive to acquire new technology-based firms 
(Graebner, 2004; Ranft & Lord, 2002). Third, in today’s economy, characterized by rapid 
innovation, shortening product cycles, increasing technological complexity and reliance 
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on highly specialized skills and expertise, it has become practically impossible to 
develop all technologies needed to maintain competitiveness within the boundaries of 
the firm itself (Puranam et al., 2006; Ranft & Lord, 2002). Under these circumstances, 
technology acquisitions offer a quick access to new technologies and capabilities. Fourth, 
small technology-based firms are attractive acquisition targets because of the 
organizational advantages at exploration (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997; Doz, 1988). By 
linking these capabilities to the complementary assets of the acquirer in manufacturing, 
marketing and distribution, acquirers seek to leverage the exploration capabilities of the 
target (Puranam et al., 2006; Teece, 1986).  
 
Also young technology-based firms are influenced by the growing popularity of 
technology acquisitions. First, there is a growing body of evidence that the pioneer 
advantage may no longer apply (Golder & Tellis, 1993 & 2002; Gao, Ritter & Zhu, 2011). 
Several studies have shown that pioneers have long-lived market share advantages and 
are likely to be market leaders in their product categories (e.g. Lambkin, 1988). 
However, the results of Golder and Tellis (1993, 2002), seriously question the existence 
of the pioneer advantage by showing that almost half of market pioneers fail and their 
mean market share is much lower than that found in other studies. On the contrary, they 
found that it are often the late entrants, that become the market leaders. Furthermore, 
early market leaders have much greater long-term success and enter on average 13 
years after the pioneers to the market. Small entrepreneurial firms typically have the 
skills and mind sets to create innovations, while established firms typically dispose of 
the capabilities to transform the idea from a niche market to a mass market (Markides & 
Gerosky, 2005). Thus, while high-tech start-ups primarily may initiate radical 
innovation, it are often the established firms that conquer and scale up these new 
markets created by start-ups. This has consequences for the way in which young 
technology-based firms can reap the benefits of their inventions. Young technology-
based firms are often dependent upon the complementary assets of incumbents to 
commercialize their products in the mainstream market. Being acquired by an 
incumbent offers the young technology-based firm access to complementary assets such 
as production, marketing and distribution capabilities (Gans & Stern, 2003). In 
summary, both high-tech start-ups and incumbents benefit from the growing 
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importance of technology acquisitions. Although being acquired implies that technology 
venture foregoes the independent commercialization of the technology and hand over 
the control over the organization to the incumbent, technology acquisitions also entail 
an important advantage: obtaining access to costly-to-build complementary assets that 
are crucial for the successful commercialization of the technology (Gans & Stern, 2003).  
 
In addition, the growing popularity of technology acquisitions implies that acquisitions 
have become an important exit strategy for the financiers that invested in high-tech 
start-ups. Empirical evidence indeed confirms that acquisitions have become 
increasingly important and account for the majority of the financial returns realized by 
venture capitalists (Gompers, 1995; Black and Gilson; 1998; Gao, Ritter & Zhu, 2011). A 
recent study of Gao et al. (2011) confirms this trend. Moreover, they argue that this 
trends confirms a structural shift as selling to a larger firm, which can help the company 
with speeding product to market and scaling up, offers more advantages relative to 
remaining as an independent firm.  
 
The following two figures confirm that trade sales have become more important than 
IPOs as exit mechanism, both in terms of numbers and value. Figure 1 provides an 
overview of the number of IPOs and trade sales realized in each year in the period 2000 
to 2008, comparing Europe with the UK. These numbers clearly demonstrate the 
importance of trade sales as exit route for VC investors. With exception of the dotcom 
bubble of 2000, IPOs are only a fraction of trade sales. A similar trend can be noted when 
considering the deal value of IPOs versus trade sales, as the total amount of money 
raised with trade sales is consistently larger than for IPOs, again with exception of the 
year 2000.  
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Figure 1: Annual evolution of trade sales and IPOs in Europe and the UK: number 
of companies1  
 
Figure 2: Annual evolution of trade sales and IPOs in Europe and the UK: Total 
amount of money raised (million $)1 
 
 
1.2. Research Questions 
The aim of this doctoral dissertation is to explore some of the antecedents of a successful 
technology acquisition. Attention is given to all three parties involved in the acquisition 
                                                          
1
 Figures obtained from VentureSource (www.venturesource.com) 
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process of a young technology-based firm, namely the acquirer, the young technology-
based firm itself and the VC investor, as each paper being part of this doctoral 
dissertation deals with one party involved. The first paper addresses how the acquirer 
can contribute to acquisition success, while the second and third paper explore the roles 
of the young technology-based firm and the venture capitalist in the process of realizing 
a trade sale. The following three paragraphs illustrate the research gaps that were 
addressed by each paper. 
 
1.2.1. Acquirer 
The topic of technology acquisitions has received a considerable amount of attention in 
both academic and business literature. Pioneering research mainly focuses on the level 
of strategic fit between target and acquirer (Rappaport, 1979; Salter & Weinhold, 1981). 
Later on, the focus shifted towards organizational fit and post-acquisition integration 
(e.g. Jemison & Sitkin, 1986; Datta, 1991; Schweizer, 2005) and on explaining the 
variance in acquisition performance (e.g. Hemmert, 2004; Ahuja & Katila, 2001). 
Potential causes for poor acquisition performance are sought in bad selection behaviour, 
high acquisition premiums and in long and costly integration processes (Gilson & Black, 
1995; Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991; Porrini, 2004). Based upon these root causes, two 
divergent literature streams emerged, one focusing on explaining preacquisition issues 
such bad selection behaviour and high premium, the other focusing on postacquisition 
integration problems. But notwithstanding this abundant literature, relatively little is 
known about the acquisition process itself and how this process impacts acquisition 
failure or success. A few papers have used a process perspective as point of departure, 
but these studies focus at one component of the acquisition process, for instance the pre-
acquisition selection stage or the post-acquisition implementation stage. However these 
studies neglected to question how the preacquisition and postacquisition stage interact 
to influence acquisition performance. To address this gap in research, we look at the 
acquisition process as a whole, carefully scrutinizing each process component for its 
influence on the subsequent acquisition stages and performance. Using a case study 
design, we unravel the process of technology acquisitions and look into the various 
mechanisms through which each process component affects the subsequent stages. The 
findings indicate that the decisions and managerial actions taken in the search and 
 32 
 
selection phase have an important impact on the success of implementation. We identify 
search and involvement of the client department as crucial mechanisms in the 
acquisition process. Furthermore, we discover that the interrelatedness of the different 
process components has important implications for the structure and composition of the 
team that manages the acquisition. 
 
1.2.2. Young technology-based firm 
In a second paper, the focus shifted from the acquirer to the young technology-based 
firm looking to be acquired. As explained above, young technology-based firms pursuing 
the strategy of being acquired operate in the market for technology. Literature on the 
market for technology thus served as a starting point to unravel the strategic actions 
contributing the realizing an acquisition. However, this stream of literature focuses 
largely on explaining licensing and neglects to consider technology acquisitions as an 
option for generating revenues in the market for technology. The entrepreneurship 
literature which focuses on commercialization strategies on the other hand, mainly 
explores how environmental factors drive the choice of commercialisation strategy 
leaving no room for managerial agency. This paper tries to address this research gap by 
investigating what factors contribute to a successful exit through trade sale. More 
specifically, this research analyses to what extent managerial actions undertaken by 
these firms impact its likelihood of being acquired and its eventual acquisition return. 
We build on insights from resource-based theory to develop hypotheses on the impact of 
resources on acquisition likelihood and return. In a sample of 285 UK YTBFs, we find 
that patents and the hiring of experienced top managers result in a higher acquisition 
likelihood, while revenues and commercial and research partnerships contribute to 
acquisition return.  
 
1.2.3. Venture Capitalist 
The objective of this paper finally, is to examine to what extent venture capital firms 
contribute to the likelihood that the portfolio company in which they invested will 
realize a trade sale. As venture capitalists are considered to be hands-on investors, one 
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can expect that they employ their experience to engage in value-adding activities and 
foster the performance of their portfolio companies. Various studies have tried to link 
the value-adding activities of VC firms to portfolio company success (e.g. Sapienza & 
Timmons, 1989; Sapienza, 1992; Schefczyk, 2001). These studies have typically looked 
at revenues (Schefczyk, 2001), growth in revenues and/or employment (Bottazzi and Da 
Rin, 2002; Davila et al., 2003) or a combination of financial and technical performance 
shortly after investment decisions (Baum and Silverman, 2004). Surprisingly, they have 
neglected to investigate how the VC firm contributes to the chances of their portfolio 
companies to realize a trade sale. Building on arguments from learning theory, this 
paper developed a number of hypotheses on the relation between vicarious, experiential 
and congenital learning of the venture capital (VC) firm and the trade sale hazard of its 
portfolio companies. Based on our analysis of 206 VC-backed UK start-ups, we find that 
both experiential learning from own trade sale experience and vicarious learning from 
syndicate partners with trade sale experience significantly increase the trade sale 
hazard. The routines and procedures learned from experienced syndicate partners 
complement experience accumulated through trial and error. Congenital trade sale 
experience of the investment managers on the contrary has no significant influence on 
the acquisition hazard.   
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2. Technology Acquisitions: A Process Perspective on Search, 
Selection and Implementation 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Technology acquisitions have become an important external source of innovation. But 
despite the popularity of technology acquisitions, there are still a lot of acquisitions that 
fail. Much of the research on technology acquisitions focuses on questionable motives, 
problems regarding valuation and selection and difficulties in the post-acquisition 
integration to explain acquisition performance. But notwithstanding this abundant 
literature, relatively little is known about the acquisition process itself and how this 
process impacts acquisition failure or success. A few papers have used a process 
perspective as point of departure, but these studies focus at one component of the 
acquisition process, for instance the pre-acquisition selection stage or the post-
acquisition implementation stage. However these studies neglected to question how 
these different process components interact to influence acquisition performance. To 
address this gap in research, we look at the acquisition process as a whole, carefully 
scrutinizing each process component for its influence on the subsequent acquisition 
stages and performance. Using a case study design, we unravel the process of technology 
acquisitions and look into the various mechanisms through which each process 
component affects the subsequent stages. The findings indicate that the decisions and 
managerial actions taken in the search and selection phase have an important impact on 
the success of implementation. We identify search and involvement of the client 
department as crucial mechanisms in the acquisition process. Furthermore, we discover 
that the interrelatedness of the different process components has important 
implications for the structure and composition of the team that manages the acquisition. 
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2.1. Introduction 
In order to gain and maintain competitive advantage, firms constantly seek to innovate 
(Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001; Teece et al., 1997). Historically, the innovation literature 
has focused on the role of internal research and development as the primary source of 
innovation and growth. However, more recently it has become clear that internal R&D 
only plays a partial role in explaining a firm’s innovation success. Organizations are 
argued to become more dependent on their ability to exploit external knowledge to 
sustain their competitive advantage (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). As a consequence, a 
company’s competitiveness does no longer merely depend on its ability to create and 
exploit knowledge internally, but also depends on its ability to access and take 
advantage of knowledge residing outside the firm. In this context, the acquisition of 
technology and more specifically the acquisition of pioneering ventures has become an 
increasingly important means to obtain access to innovative technologies (Hitt et al., 
1991; Chakrabarti et al., 1994, Vanhaverbeke et al., 2002). Small technology-based firms 
are attractive targets to acquirers as sources of technological input and innovation 
capabilities in settings of rapid technological change (Arora et al., 2001). The knowledge 
and technologies gained through external mechanisms will be less path-dependent and 
may therefore lead to a greater variance of resource combinations and better innovation 
performance (Fleming, 2001; Levinthal & March, 1993; Nelson & Winter, 1982) When 
searching for new opportunities, managers tend to search close-in before moving into 
uncharted terrains (Cyert & March, 1963). In a world where innovation opportunities 
are limited, internal innovation opportunities will soon become exhausted. In order to 
find new opportunities firms will need to search further from their existing operations. 
Technology acquisitions may offer such an opportunity. Certainly, technology 
acquisitions have become an important external source of innovation, what’s more, their 
importance is still increasing over time (Tellis & Golder, 2002; Markides & Geroski, 
2005). Figures from PriceWaterHouseCoopers reveal that the M&A activity in the 
technology sector has recovered from the burst of the dotcom bubble, by showing a 
sharp increase in both the number of transactions and transactions value for the period 
2003-2007. 2007 proved an increase of 24% in number of deals and 44% increase of 
deal value (Morgan & Ryan, 2008). But despite their growing popularity, there are still 
 42 
 
many acquisitions that have failed to achieve their objectives (e.g. Ranft & Lord, 2002; 
Graebner, 2004).  
 
Many researchers have tried to explain acquisition performance. Within the literature 
that focuses on technology acquisitions, two streams of research can be distinguished: 
one focuses on problems during the preacquisition stage to explain acquisition success, 
while the other stream looks into postacquisition issues to explain acquisition 
performance. Pre-acquisition misjudgements are usually explained by information 
asymmetries between the target and the future acquirer. Various researchers have 
investigated what mechanisms can be used to reduce this information asymmetry (e.g. 
Benson & Ziedonis, 2009; Reuer & Ragozinno, 2008; Porrini, 2004; Kohers & Kohers, 
2001; Coff, 1999). The second stream on the other hand, has focused predominantly on 
organizational problems that arising during the postacquisition implementation state. 
Part of this literature looks at the optimal organizational structure to realize synergies, 
with the dilemma of integration versus autonomy at the forefront ((e.g., Puranam et al., 
2006; Puranam & Srikanth, 2007; Schweizer, 2005). Others have focused on 
mechanisms and strategies that foster coordination and knowledge transfer (Kapoor & 
Lim, 2007; Kiessling & Harvey, 2006; Graebner, 2004; Ranft & Lord, 2002). While both 
streams of research provides some very useful insights for acquirers to improve post 
acquisitions results, a link between those two research streams is missing.  By focusing 
on one stage of the acquisition process, i.e. the preacquisition stage or the 
postacquisition, both streams of research have neglected to investigated how 
preacquisition affects postacquisition implementation. This is surprising as ever since 
the publication of the work of Jemison and Sitkin (1986), it is widely accepted that the 
acquisition process itself is an important determinant of acquisition success. Therefore, 
the objective of this paper is to integrate both literature views by investigating how the 
preacquisition stage affects postacquisition implementation. For this purpose a process 
study will be used. In essence, the process perspective concentrates on explaining how 
managerial actions and decisions taken during the acquisition process affect the 
acquisition success, i.e. the extent to which synergies are realized (Birkinshaw et al., 
2000). In fact, researchers have long understood that the value creation following an 
acquisition must be studied by examining the actions that lead up to the acquisition 
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decision along with the integration and management activities that follow the decision 
(Jemison & Sitkin, 1986). However, in reality the number of process studies that capture 
the whole acquisition process from search and selection through implementation is 
relatively limited. This paper tries to fill this gap by scrutinizing the complete acquisition 
process from defining the acquisition strategy to the acquisition outcome. More 
specifically, this paper explores how decisions taken during the preacquisition stages 
affect postacquisition implementation. Our empirical fieldwork reveals that every 
process component has an impact on the eventual acquisition outcome. Each process 
component not only affects the acquisition outcome but also has an impact on the 
subsequent process stages. The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, we add to the 
literature on technology acquisitions that predominantly has been focusing on the 
integration dilemma by complementing this organizational view with the economics on 
information view. This paper makes the connection between preacquisition literature 
and postacquisition literature by looking at the whole acquisition process. Our 
framework illustrates how implementation problems may be caused by mistakes made 
in the preceding stages of search, selection and due diligence and how this affects team 
management. Furthermore, we extend the literature by providing evidence that 
acquirers not only learn from their previous acquisitions, but learning also plays an 
important role within the acquisition process. Effective search allows the acquirer to 
learn from the target before the actual action and smoothens both the selection and 
implementation process. Furthermore, the results indicate that in each stage valuable 
knowledge is gathered and that it is important to share this knowledge with all 
employees involved in both the acquisition process: employees involved in the 
postacquisition stage should learn from the knowledge gathered by the employees 
involved in the preacquisition stage. A second contribution of the paper is empirical. 
This paper addresses the call for more case studies in the field of technological 
acquisitions. The case study provides a deeper insight in the process of technology 
acquisitions and identifies a number of mechanisms that are crucial in the search and 
selection phase as they influence the implementation and eventually the acquisition 
outcome.   
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The remainder of this paper unfolds along the following lines. First, we elaborate on the 
concept of technology acquisitions, we provide a short literature review on this 
phenomenon. Second, we describe the research design and the research setting. Third, 
we draw on the empirical fieldwork to build a theoretical framework that extends our 
knowledge on the process of managing technology acquisitions. Although the data 
gathered guided our theory building, the different literature streams relevant for this 
study are taken into account, thereby addressing one of the most common 
misconceptions about grounded theory (Suddeby, 2006). Finally, we recapitulate the 
main conclusions and discuss the limitations and implications.  
 
2.2. Literature review 
During the past decades, incumbents increasingly rely on technology acquisitions to gain 
the new technologies and capabilities needed to sustain or enhance their 
competitiveness. The acquisition of small technology-based firms has become an 
important means to obtain valuable resources such as technologies and innovation 
capabilities (Ahuja & Katila, 2001; Ranft & Lord, 2002). Following Huber (1991) and 
Puranam (2001), we define technology acquisitions as “acquisitions of small, 
technology-based firms by large, established firms made so that the larger firm can graft 
acquired technological capabilities onto their own resource bases”.   
 
Various motives incite incumbents to the acquisition of small technology-based firms. 
First of all, in today’s environment characterized by rapid innovation, shortening 
product cycles, technological complexity and reliance on highly specialized skills and 
expertise, it has become very difficult, if not impossible, to develop all the technologies 
and capabilities needed to maintain competitiveness within the firm itself (Puranam et 
al., 2006; Ranft & Lord, 2002). Organizations therefore rely on technology acquisition as 
a prompt gateway to new technologies and capabilities. Second, the resources gained 
through external sourcing are less path-dependent, thereby offering new opportunities 
for resource combinations  to foster innovative output (Fleming, 2001, Levinthal & 
March, 1993; Nelson & Winter, 1982). Internal development on the other hand may be 
perceived as more risky than acquisitions that provide faster access to the marketplace 
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(Hitt et al., 1990). Furthermore, small technology-based firms are attractive acquisition 
targets because of their organizational advantages at exploration (Brown & Eisenhardt, 
1997; Doz, 1988). By linking these capabilities to the complementary assets of the 
acquirer in manufacturing, marketing and distribution, acquirers seek to leverage the 
exploration capabilities of the target (Puranam et al. 2006; Teece, 1986) Finally, in 
knowledge-intensive and innovation-driven industries, also the acquisition of profound 
expertise and technical skills constitutes a central motive to acquire new technology-
based firms (Graebner, 2004; Ranft & Lord, 2002).  
 
Despite the aforementioned clear economic advantages technology acquisitions 
encompass, there are also some disadvantages. There are still many technology 
acquisitions that fail to achieve their objectives and result in poor performance 
(Schweizer, 2005; Graebner, 2004; Ranft & Lord, 2002). Two root causes of poor 
performance can be distinguished. First, potential causes for poor acquisition 
performance are attributed to bad selection behaviour and paying high acquisition 
premiums (Gilson & Black, 1995; Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991; Porrini, 2004). Second, 
the reasons for failure are also attributed to long and costly integration processes of 
these acquired firms. Capturing value from acquisitions depends on the effective 
management of the post-deal implementation (Schweizer, 2005; Graebner, 2004, 
Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991). Within this line of research, the focus has primarily been 
on managing the organisational dilemma of coordination versus autonomy. To what 
extent and under which circumstances do these acquired technology ventures have to be 
integrated in the main structure of the company versus remaining autonomous, 
independent ventures?  
 
To summarize, we can conclude that literature distinguishes between two stages: the 
preacquisition stage and the postacquisition stage. Whereas preacquisition 
misjudgements are usually explained by economics of information, postacquisition 
integration issues are explained by organisational theory. In the following paragraphs, 
we first throw a light on the acquisition process, discussing the different steps in the 
pre- and postacquisition stage. Second, a literature review is provided on pre-acquisition 
 46 
 
problems caused by information asymmetry. Finally, we elaborate on the organisational 
causes of acquisition failure, elaborating both on the problems and suggested solution in 
the post-acquisition implementation phase.  
 
2.2.1. The acquisition process 
Roughly, the acquisition process can be broken down in two stages, the preacquisition 
stage and postacquisition stage, with in between the actual acquisition, i.e. the 
consummating of the deal. The preacquisition stage in turn consists of three successive 
stages: Formulation of acquisition strategy, search for and screening of potential targets, 
and the final selection of the acquisition target. Each acquisition starts with the 
formulation of an acquisition strategy. This strategy presents a clear set of objectives 
that serve as a foundation for the following stage: the search and screening stage. In this 
stage potential acquisition targets are identified and prioritized. This stage not only 
entails the search for potential targets but also covers an important learning aspect as 
will be illustrated below. Subsequently, in the selection stage, the potential targets are 
evaluated and one target is selected for acquisition. In the acquisition stage, the acquirer 
enters into negotiations with the target until an agreement is reached. Next to the price 
and method of payment, also the retention of key personnel and physical integration 
constitute an important part of the negotiations. Once the deal is consummated, one 
enters the postacquisition or implementation stage. In this stage, the business potential 
created in the previous stages is now realized by transferring and combining resources 
and capabilities to create competitive advantage. The following figure gives an overview 
of the acquisition process (Adapted from Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991): 
Figure 3: the acquisition process 
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2.2.2. The economics of information view 
Acquisitions in general and technology acquisition in particular allow organizations to 
obtain access to knowledge that is of high strategic importance but of low familiarity 
(Leonard-Barton, 1995). However the quality of this knowledge is hard to assess, 
leading to information asymmetry between acquirer and target and adverse selection 
(Coff, 1999). As a result of this information asymmetry, acquirers may struggle with 
assessing the true synergy potential of acquisition candidates. Several M&A studies have 
noted that information asymmetry may have a significant impact on the likelihood and 
performance implications of acquisitions (Eckbo et al., 1990). In this line of research, 
information asymmetry models assume that one party to a transaction disposes of more 
or better information than the other party to the transaction (Akerlof, 1970). In essence, 
there are two major forms of information asymmetry: hidden information and hidden 
action. Hidden information occurs when one party to a transaction knows relevant 
information that is not known to the other party. In a market where buyers cannot 
accurately assess the quality of the products, prices will reflect average quality which 
causes parties of good quality to leave the market, resulting in a market dominated by 
parties of inferior quality and adverse selection (Akerlof, 1970; Leland & Pyle, 1977 en 
Chan & Leland, 1982). Hidden action on the other hand, occurs when one party cannot 
observe relevant actions taken by the other party.  
 
Two responses are offered so solve the problem of adverse selection: signalling and 
screening. The natural market response to adverse selection is signalling (Spence, 1973). 
Signalling defines the process of informing potential investors on the quality of the 
venture in a credible, trustworthy manner (Campbell & Kracaw, 1980; Spence, 1973). 
Acquirers have to make their investment decision under a high degree of uncertainty, 
resulting in high levels of information asymmetry and therefore seek signals of target 
quality. Screening serves as another potential solution of the adverse selection problem. 
In this case the uninformed party of buyer offers a contract that causes informed parties 
to self-select (Rothschild & Stiglitz, 1976). Screening may offer a more appropriate 
technique as it allows one economic agent to extract otherwise private information from 
another (Spence, 1973). Therefore, in the context of technology acquisitions screening 
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can also be described as the due diligence process in which the investment opportunities 
are carefully scrutinized.  
 
Acquirers of small technology-based firms are confronted with high levels of 
information asymmetry for a number of reasons. First of all, the assets of these firms 
mainly comprise intangible assets which are hard to assess as financial statements only 
mention tangible assets (Cooper et al., 1988). Second, buyers have difficulties assessing 
what will be transferred and what not due to employee turnover and knowledge 
tacitness. Much of the value of technology ventures depends on the human capital. If key 
personnel leave after acquisition, the value of the human capital decreases (Graebner, 
2004).  Third, there is uncertainty on the synergies that can be created as the combined 
capabilities cannot be observed a priori; synergies with human capital and knowledge 
intensive firms, such as technology ventures, require effective knowledge transfer in 
order to materialize on the synergy potential (Coff, 1999). However, it may be difficult to 
assess how much knowledge will be transferred. Fourth, small technology-based firms 
are typically confronted with high levels of market and technical uncertainty (Chaudhuri 
et al., 2005). And finally, the target is usually a company with limited maturity and a 
restricted track record. Little historical and codified information is available on these 
new technology ventures (Hannan & Freeman, 1989). All these factors provoke high 
levels of information asymmetry which hinder the acquirer to adequately select, value 
and integrate the target.  
 
In the literature on technology acquisitions, a number of factors have been analysed 
which enable the acquirer to reduce information asymmetry. Coff (1999) for example 
demonstrates that buyers cope with this information asymmetry and related 
uncertainty by (1) offering lower bid premiums; (2) using contingent payment such as 
earn outs and stock payment and (3) increasing information both through lengthy 
negotiations and by avoiding tender offers. These coping strategies however, become 
less important when the acquirer has no intention of integrating the target.  
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Moreover, also acquisition experience and previous alliances may help moderate 
information asymmetry. Empirical evidence indeed shows that firms with previous 
acquisition experiences perform better than firms without previous acquisitions 
performance as this experience allow acquirers to develop some routines which help 
them selecting, valuing and integrating acquisition targets (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 
1999; Bruton et al., 1994; Fowler and Schmidt, 1989). Haleblian and Finkelstein (1999) 
their findings indicate the presence of a curvilinear relationship between acquisition 
experience and acquisition performance. Besides, the more the targets resembles 
previous targets, the better acquisition performance. Porrini (2004) on the other hand 
investigated the impact of previous alliances on acquisition performance. Her results 
point out that previous alliances have indeed a positive impact on acquisition 
performance. These effects are even stronger when it concerns R&D, technology 
transfer, manufacturing and marketing alliances in comparison to licensing alliances. 
Also Reuer & Ragozinno (2008) confirm that interfirm alliances between target and 
acquirer may be helpful to reduce information asymmetry, as this alliance serves as a 
signal of quality.  
 
2.2.3. The organizational view 
The organizational view focuses on the problems that arise during the implementation 
phase. One of the most prevalent problems during implementation is the autonomy 
versus coordination paradox. Post-acquisition integration both hinders and facilitates 
the efforts of the acquirer to leverage the knowledge and technology of the target and 
realize the expected synergies (Birkinshaw et al.; 1999, Chaudhuri et al., 2005); 
Puranam & Srikanth, 2007). Puranam et al. (2006) argue that the key to resolving the 
coordination-autonomy dilemma is considering the development stages of the target’s 
innovation trajectory. Their findings confirm that structural integration leads to better 
innovation outcomes when the target has already launched products. However, when no 
products are launched yet by the target, structural separation seems to be the preferred 
post acquisition structural forms. In other words, when the knowledge and capabilities 
of the target have not been codified in the form of a product, structural separation is 
recommended. Not only because this structural form preserves the innovation 
capabilities and routines of the target, but also because the high levels of information 
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asymmetry hamper the decision abilities of the acquirer. Therefore, the target is in 
better place to manage its innovation activities. On the other hand, when the knowledge 
and capabilities of the target are codified in the form of a product, information 
asymmetry decreases which allows the acquirer to manage the activities of the target. 
What’s more, effective coordination between target and acquirer becomes more 
important to manage the manufacturing, marketing and distribution activities. In this 
case, structural integration is recommended. Similar conclusions are found in a follow-
up paper of Puranam and Srikanth in 2007. This study demonstrates that integration 
helps acquirers to leverage the knowledge-base of the target but hinders the leveraging 
of the innovation capabilities of the target. Schweizer (2005) on the other hand, 
distinguishes between R&D-related and non-R&D-related activities to resolve the 
integration dilemma. He proposes a hybrid integration approach: R&D related activities 
or the activities with the highest degree of information asymmetry should retain a high 
degree of autonomy, while the non-R&D-activities should be integrated. Other authors 
focus not on the choice of integration itself but on mechanisms and strategies that foster 
coordination and knowledge transfer and thereby help resolving the integration 
paradox. Graebner (2004) for instance argues that the leaders of the acquired firm play 
a crucial role in bridging the information gap that exists between acquirer and target. By 
engaging in mobilizing and mitigating actions, they contribute to the creation of both 
expected and serendipitous value. Ranft and Lord (2002) stress the importance of rich 
communication between acquirer and target for a number of reasons. First, rich 
communication facilitates the preservation of the technologies and capabilities of the 
target. But more importantly, rich communication also smoothens the process of 
knowledge transfer. Furthermore, they underline the importance of speed of 
integration: slower acquisition implementation allows for a learning period during 
which the acquirer and the target begin to cooperate and transfer knowledge. Finally, 
also retention of key personnel (Kiessling & Harvey, 2006; Graeber, 2004) is crucial as 
they are the most critical assets. The target’s technological capabilities depend upon the 
skills and expertise of these people. Kapoor & Lim (2007) underline the importance of 
similar routines and skills to smoothen coordination, however too much overlap in 
routines and skills may limit the cross-fertilization of ideas.   
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The literature described in the previous paragraphs gives an overview of the 
determinants of failure and success in technology acquisitions. Part of the literature has 
looked at the pre-acquisition knowledge and activities and a more recent stream of 
research has focused on the post-acquisition integration aspect. Despite this abundant 
literature, relatively little is known about the acquisition process itself and its impact on 
failure and success.  Where previous process studies mainly focus on the 
implementation phase, this paper looks at the acquisition process as a whole, carefully 
scrutinizing each process component and its impact on the acquisition outcome. In 
specific, we investigate how decisions and managerial actions implemented during the 
preacquisition stage have an impact on postacquisition implementation and 
performance.  
 
2.3. Methods and data 
2.3.1. Description of the methodology 
As we are interested in explaining how decisions taken during the search and selection 
stage affect postacquisition implementation and performance, a case study approach is 
most appropriate. More specifically, a process study approach was used. The process 
perspective frames acquisitions as a series of decision-making steps each of which has 
an impact on the final outcome of the full acquisition process (Jemison & Sitkin, 1986). A 
case methodology is particularly useful in studying the process of M&A’s, as it enables 
the researcher to explore the processes through which synergies are identified and 
actualized (Larsson, 1993). In spite of Larsson’s advocacy, a case study methodology has 
only been used in a limited number of M&A research studies (Pablo & Javindan, 2004). 
Therefore, to address the research question, we will combine a case study design and 
inductive empirical investigation. This is the most appropriate research design, as the 
main goal of this paper is to further extent the existing theory on technology 
acquisitions. The first step consisted of selecting an appropriate case. When selecting an 
appropriate case, the following criteria were taken in account. First, we used to 
definition put forward by Puranam et al. (2006) to define the research population. 
Puranam et al. (2006) define technology acquisition as acquisitions of small technology-
based firms made by large established firms to graft the acquired technological 
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capabilities onto their own resource bases. Second, as we are extending theory on 
managing technology acquisitions based case studies, it makes sense to select an 
extreme case (Eisenhardt, 1989). We thus selected a case that was considered to be a 
failure. Finally, we also willingness to cooperate and to provide us with extensive 
backing documents was included as a selection criterion. Together, these criteria led to 
the selection of an acquisition done by a leading telecom operator in Belgium, we call 
Belganet. We studied the acquisition of Mobile Everywhere by Belganet. 
 
Once the case is selected, also the interviewees must be selected. To select the 
interviewees we use the snowball technique. The sampling should begin with top 
managers as they are critical players in perceptions about change in organizations and 
are therefore identified as key informants (Kumar et al., 1993). Hence, top managers 
that were involved in the acquisition process were interviewed. After each interview we 
asked the interviewee who else was involved in the process and could provide us with 
relevant and important information on the topic. We continued this procedure until no 
new names came to the surface. In total we conducted nine interviews. We interviewed 
both managers and lower-level employees.  
 
The interviews were conducted by two interviewers and took on average between one 
and two hours. All interviewees were recorded and the tapes were transcribed verbatim 
to increase to reliability of the results. Furthermore, we asked each of the participants if 
they could provide us with documentation on the process. We were given access to more 
than 300 pages of internal PowerPoint presentations. These presentations contain the 
presentation used to defend the acquisition for the board of directors, presentations on 
the implementation and task segmentation, communications of Belganet to Mobile 
Everywhere, etc. We had also access to financial information, more specifically to the 
financial sheets that were used to calculate the stand-alone and synergy value of the 
target company. Furthermore, we used annual reports and press releases to back up the 
story. Altogether, these documents provide over 500 pages of secondary data sources 
and are useful for the following reasons. First, they make it possible to construct a 
quantitative picture of the process under study (Burgelman, 1994). Second, they allow 
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checking for potential systemic bias due to retrospective thinking (Golden, 1992). 
Afterwards, each interview was discussed by the two interviewees and a third 
independent person in order to increase the validity of the data. We used content 
analysis to analyse the data. The interview transcripts serve as main source of data and 
basis for analysis, however observation and documentation data were included as 
triangulation and supplementary data sources (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Each 
interview report was coded independently by the two interviewers. Afterwards, the 
coding was put together and compared. Whenever the coding differed, a discussion 
followed until agreement was reached.  
 
Table 1 Overview of interviewees 
Source 
Interviews Internal Documents 
Number Function Number Pages 
St
a
ge
 
Preacquisition 3 
Director Business Development 
4 125 Lead Manager Strategy and Business Development 
Segment Leader Alliances 
Acquisition 2 
Director Business Development 
1 9 Lead Manager Strategy and Business Development 
  
Postacquisition 7 
Director Business Development 
8 189 
Segment Leader Alliances 
Partnership Development Manager 
VP Business Development 
Responsible Sales SME market 
Responsible Sales Large market 
Responsible Sales Corporate market 
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2.3.2. Research Setting: Belganet – Mobile Everywhere2 
The Belganet group is a Belgian telecom operator and is active in three main fields: 
fixed-line services, mobile communication services and international services. In 1994 
Belganet launched the Mobinet cellular network. All mobile communications services 
are provided by this venture. It is Mobinet who initiated the acquisition of Mobile 
Everywhere in 2006. At that time, Mobinet was market leader in the mobile market. 
However, competition was becoming fiercer and margins were dropping. In addition, 
the core business of Mobinet, connectivity, has become a commodity. Consequently, 
Mobinet decided to move up the value chain, integrate vertically and enter the business 
of mobile applications. It is in this context that the acquisition of Mobile Everywhere 
should be situated. In 2006, the year of acquisition, Belganet had total revenues of 6.1 
billion Euros, an EBITDA of 2.4 billion Euros and employed about 18000 people. Mobile 
Everywhere was founded in March 2002. The company specialized in the development 
of mobile solutions on the PDA (Personal Digital Assistant) and synchronization of data 
between the PDA and the traditional ICT-system of the company, like e.g. ERP and CRM. 
The start-up Mobile Everywhere was not a case of solo-entrepreneurship. The founding 
team consisted of three men in their early thirties who realize they operate in a business 
which is still in its infants. After running through all potential applications of this new 
technology, they realized that the PDA offered a wide range of opportunities. Affordable 
mobile solutions were in great demand in all industries. Still only a handful of companies 
were specialized in this business. Because of their joint experience with PDA’s and data 
control, they decided to found Mobile Everywhere. In 2006, Mobile Everywhere was 
acquired by Belganet/Mobinet. At the moment of acquisition, Mobile Everywhere had 
more than 40 clients. The company mainly focused its activities on mobile sales people 
in two well-defined industries, Fast Moving Consumer Goods – Food and Non-Food 
(distribution, hotel & catering industry) – and Pharma (medical sales, OTC). At that time, 
Mobile Everywhere had 26 employees and a turnover of about 1.5 million Euro. 
 
  
                                                          
2
 The names of the companies involved in the case study are kept anonymous for confidentiality reasons. 
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2.4. Findings 
Using a case study design we investigate how the acquisition process affects the 
acquisition outcome. Each phase of the acquisition outcome not only has an impact on 
the eventual outcome of the acquisition but also affects the next stage in the process. As 
a consequence all these stages are interrelated and jointly shape the acquisition 
outcome. In the next paragraphs, we examine through which mechanisms each stage has 
an impact on the subsequent stage and the acquisition success or failure. More 
specifically, we study the extent to which search and selection practices in pre-
acquisition process affect the subsequent stages of acquisition process. For each phase, 
one or several mechanisms are discovered that affect the subsequent stages and the 
eventual outcome of the acquisition. 
 
2.4.1. Empirical findings 
In 1994 Belganet launched the Mobinet cellular network. The main activity of this 
venture was to provide mobile communication services. Mobinet became market leader 
and by 2002 the first mobile operator in Belgium to offer all customers internet access 
via GPRS. However by 2005, Mobinet experienced that margins were dropping as 
connectivity became more and more a commodity. As a response to this threat, a new 
strategy was launched by the Strategy and Business Development department in order 
to materialize the opportunities offered by mobile IT. In order to materialize the 
opportunities offered by mobile IT, Mobinet decided it needed to move up the value 
chain and integrate vertically. In the future, Mobinet wanted to become a prime 
contractor of mobile solutions. Since Mobinet has no real internal R&D activities, it 
opted to look outside its boundaries for potential mobile applications. In the past, 
Mobinet had set up a wide range of partnerships with the players in this field. However, 
Mobinet decided to acquire a company instead of relying on partnerships, as this 
allowed them to move up the value chain much faster and capture more value in 
comparison to partnerships. The Strategy and Business Development department was 
responsible for the first four phases in the acquisition process, namely the definition of 
the acquisition strategy, the search process of identifying and valuing potential targets, 
the selection process and the negotiations. The main objective of the Strategy and 
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Business Development (S&BD) department is to monitor the environment to detect 
opportunities and partner with those small markets that have the opportunities to 
become big. To accomplish this objective and spot opportunities, the department 
attends conferences, uses trend watching tools and calls on external consultants. Since it 
was clear that the future of Belganet/Mobinet is in the business of mobile ICT, it was the 
job of S&BD to select those opportunities with the highest potential. After scanning the 
market of mobile IT, the S&BD decided that mobile sales & field force, email and 
personal information management are those IT-applications which were likely to be 
mobilized first. However, the mobile applications email and personal information 
management were considered to add low value. Mobile sales and field auditing on the 
other hand, were the markets with the highest growth potential. In summary, the 
acquisition strategy of Belganet to materialize the opportunities offered by mobile IT 
consisted of acquiring a young company that had the technology to offer mobile sales 
and field auditing services and that targeted the mid-company size market. Belganet 
decided to target the mid-market because market research indicated that Belganet has a 
high credibility in this segment, in addition Belganet’s customers are to a large extend 
SMEs which implies synergies are to be created in this segment.  
Once the acquisition strategy was defined, all small players in this market were 
identified and contacted to discuss future collaboration. In this step, the alliance team 
was involved as well. They already had a good understanding of the players in the 
market, since they were responsible for creating partnerships that allow selling the own 
products. As each player in the value chain has its competences, co-selling agreements 
allow increasing sales. Consequently, the alliance team knew the ICT market very well 
and was able to identify all relevant players in the market of mobile sales and field 
auditing.  A due diligence of all these players was carried out and the following selection 
criteria were taken in account: technical competences, business competences and track 
record and organizational fit. Based on these analyses, two targets were identified, one 
of which is acquired: Mobile Everywhere. After nine long months of negotiations, both 
parties reached an agreement: Mobile Everywhere was sold to Mobinet for 5.3 million 
Euros: 4.1 million fixed payment and 1.2 million earn-out. This valuation was based on 
the stand-alone business case. Taken in account the expected synergies, the value was 
three times as high. With the acquisition, Mobinet hoped to realize some cost synergies 
like common marketing and IT. However, the emphasis was on the creation of revenue 
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synergies. Mobinet expected that they were able to increase the sales to 150 % of the 
sales generated by Mobile Everywhere, by linking the Mobinet brand and customer base 
to the Mobile Everywhere products.  
 
However, during the interviews it became clear that the acquisition was not an 
unqualified success and the expected synergies were not realized. Belganet was not able 
to realize the expected synergies for a number of reasons. Although the strategy behind 
the acquisition is clear and everyone agrees that mobile ICT applications were indeed 
the future of Belganet, the acquisition could not realize its full potential. Based upon the 
interviews, we ascertained a number of reasons why the acquisition did fall short on 
expectations. First, the market of for the product of Mobile Everywhere was not as 
developed as expected.  All the representatives of the sales department (i.e. someone 
from the SME market, someone in charge of the large market and someone in charge of 
the corporate market) confirmed that the market “is still in its early adopter phase”. 
Especially the market of small and medium companies is not ready to adopt the 
technology. The sales representative of the SME market admitted “My experience for SME 
is negative, but that doesn't mean that there is no potential. I do think there is a potential 
market, but the product should first be sold to Corporate and Large. And later on, SME will 
follow”. It appeared that Belganet was a bit too optimistic with respect to the expected 
synergies. Belganet thought that synergies could be realized by simply linking the 
customer base and brand of Belganet to the Mobile Everywhere product. Reality 
however, was more complicated.  
 
Second, moving up the value chain was more difficult than expected. The sales cycles of 
the two companies were totally different. The sales process for a Belganet product was 
rather reactive and sales cycles are short. The sales process for Mobile Everywhere’ 
product on the other hand was pro-active; it was about knowing the company and 
addressing its needs. As a consequence the sales cycle was longer. Selling Mobile 
Everywhere’ product required a different mindset, different contacts, and different sales 
talks. In order for the Belganet people to be able to sell the product, effective knowledge 
transfer from Mobile Everywhere to Belganet was required in the course of which 
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Belganet people are trained to develop the necessary skills. Finally, there were some 
problems relating to the team that managed the acquisition. In the whole process, 
several teams succeeded each other in the management of the acquisition. Obviously, the 
hand-over of the acquisition file from one team to another implies the loss of a lot of 
information. Overall, the acquisition could have benefited from a better preparation of 
the implementation phase. The following time line summarizes the important events in 
the acquisition process:  
Figure 5: Timeline of Mobile Everywhere acquisition 
 
 
 
In the following paragraphs, we dilate upon the root causes of these problems and try to 
unravel how they could have been averted. We investigate how each process component 
has an impact on the subsequent processes and the overall success or failure of the 
acquisition. In particular we investigate how managerial actions and decisions taken in 
the search and selection phases of the process interact to influence the realization of the 
expected synergies and the acquisition outcome.  
 
2.4.1.1. The impact of Search 
Once the acquisition strategy is defined the search for potential acquisition candidates 
can begin. In business literature this search process is defined as the identification 
process of potential acquisition targets that fit the acquisition profile (Depamphilis, 
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ideas, new forms of organization and/or solutions to existing problems (Stuart & 
Podolny, 1996; Katila 2002; Katila & Ahuja, 2002). These search processes can be seen 
as a dynamic capability that enlarges the knowledge base of a firm and therefore allows 
firms to sustain their competitive advantage over time. Accordingly, search in 
organizations is an important part of the organizational learning process through which 
firms attempt to solve problems (Huber, 1991). Due to path dependency, most firms that 
seek to enlarge their knowledge base restrict their search process to familiar and 
proximate areas (Rosenkopf & Almeida, 2003). This local search process is especially 
beneficial to create incremental innovation, as firms become more expert in their 
current domain (Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001). Recent literature, however, emphasises 
that sustainable competitive advantage relies more heavily on the firm’s dynamic 
capabilities to move beyond local search and reconfigure its knowledge base. The work 
of Stuart and Podolny (1996) for example illustrates that Matsushita was able to 
reposition itself by moving away from local search and by committing itself to a series of 
alliances with other firms that gave them access to different technologies. Also the 
results of Rosenkopf & Nerkar (2001) indicate that organizations that want to move 
beyond their current industry should engage in radical exploration. Similar results can 
also be found in the study of Katila (2002). Her results point out that old intra industry-
knowledge hampers innovation, while old extra-industry knowledge stimulates 
innovation.  
 
These findings imply that organizations looking for technology acquisitions need search 
mechanisms that enable them to learn from the knowledge residing outside the firm.. 
EIRMA (2004) distinguished the following modes for accessing external information: 
purchase of technology, joint venturing and alliances, joint development, contract R&D, 
licensing, collaborations with universities, equity in university spin-offs and equity in 
venture capital investment funds. All these mechanisms may serve as search strategies 
as they allow building up knowledge on a certain technology. Therefore, we define 
search strategies in the context of technology acquisitions as mechanisms to access 
external knowledge and information. However not all mechanisms are suited as search 
strategies for technology acquisitions as some of these mechanisms already hold with 
them the ownership of, or at least the right to exploit the technology. For that reason, we 
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define alliances, corporate venture capital, university-industry links and joint ventures 
as open search strategies. 
 
Searching for and valuing entrepreneurial targets is often problematic because 
entrepreneurial firms are difficult to locate as exchange partners (Deeds et al., 1999). 
While at the same time, entrepreneurial firms tend to find it more difficult to signal their 
business prospects to investors (McConnell & Pettit, 1984). Moreover, private 
companies tend to involve higher transaction costs in the presence of search and 
valuation problems than their public counterparts (Pablo & Javindan, 2004). 
 
When investigating the case, we discovered that search is indeed more than identifying 
and valuing potential targets. This phase may also comprise an important learning 
aspect as the acquirer tries to access external knowledge on potential targets. The case 
study revealed that existing partnerships were a very important source of information. 
These partnerships not only smoothen the process of identifying potential targets, the 
knowledge gathered through these partnerships also serves as a valuable input in the 
selection phase and in the subsequent acquisition phases. Belganet was able to identify 
all relevant players that fitted the acquisition profile thanks to the co-selling agreements 
it had with most of the relevant players in the market of mobile sales and field auditing. 
When entering new businesses, Belganet “always first tries to work with partners to 
develop this new business, these collaborations serve as a window on new technologies and 
the herewith related opportunities”.  The interviews revealed that the search activities in 
the form of co-selling agreements affected the acquisition outcome through two 
separate mechanisms. First, the search stage increased the market and technological 
knowledge on mobiles sales and auditing. The information gathered during the search 
phase was a crucial input in the selection phase and in the negotiations as it allowed the 
acquirer to assess the combination potential of the opportunity. The target-specific 
information gathered during the collaboration reduces the information asymmetry. This 
reduced information asymmetry in turn smoothens the progress of the selection and 
due diligence and contributes to the overall acquisition performance. This mechanism is 
also illustrated in figure 3. Several M&A studies have pointed out that information 
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asymmetry may indeed have a negative impact on acquisition performance (Eckbo et al., 
1990). Thanks to these partnerships, Belganet was able to scan the market of 
technologies and choose those technical solutions with the highest potential, as 
confirmed by one of the interviewees: “The advantage of having an alliance team is that 
it enabled us to get in touch with the mobile ICT market… We of the alliance team knew 
that we were given the space to set up these partnerships because sooner or later Belganet 
would acquirer one of these partners”. Also Porrini (2004) her findings confirm that 
alliances allow to build up target-specific information and experience, benefiting 
selection, valuation and integration of acquisitions. Search is not only a facilitator of the 
acquisition process because of its knowledge generating impact, it has also an impact on 
the quality of the relationship between acquirer and target, i.e. the second mechanism 
through which search affect acquisition performance. During the search phase, Belganet 
contacted all its partners in the mobile sales and field auditing business and asked in all 
openness “how can we collaborate better in the future?”. This approach created a climate 
of trust and stimulated a friendly environment in which the negotiations took place. “The 
negotiations were very intense, but always civil. I had a lot of respect for them and they had 
a lot of respect for me” It also decreased the resistance of the employees of the target to 
the acquisition. In fact, most of the employees were happy to become part of Belganet, 
since they worked so well together in the past: “The moment the acquisition was 
completed, the CEO of Mobile Everywhere started communicating this to his employees; at 
that point in time they were very happy to become part of Belganet”. The fruitful 
collaboration before the acquisition created a climate of trust that had a positive impact 
on the negotiations and implementation phase. Several studies confirm that high levels 
of trust between partners stimulate people to engage in social exchange and by doing so 
share more knowledge and information (Ring & Van de Ven, 1992). Since effective 
knowledge transfer is crucial for the success of technology acquisitions, trust 
contributes to a considerable extent to the performance of the acquisitions. Trust 
increases the willingness of partners to share knowledge and information (Inkpen & 
Tsang, 2005), because it alleviates the fear for opportunistic behaviour from the other 
partner(s) in the collaboration (Bradach & Eccles, 1989).  Moreover, trust facilitates the 
process of exchange tacit and difficult to codify information, which is by definition hard 
to communicate and to trade by markets (Kogut & Zander, 1992). The following figure 
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summarizes the mechanisms through which search affects the acquisition process and 
acquisition outcome: 
Figure 6: How search affects the subsequent phases of the acquisition process and 
the acquisition outcome.  
 
 
2.4.1.2. The impact of selection 
The search phase is followed by a selection phase, which comprises the selection of one 
acquisition target and a technical and a market or business due diligence. The technical 
due diligence was done properly: Belganet did have a good understanding of the 
technology beforehand. They knew what the technology was about and what the 
application could do. The business or market analysis on the other hand, aims at 
assessing the business potential of the acquisition. Since technology acquisitions seek to 
create synergies by leveraging the technological knowledge of entrepreneurial ventures 
by linking them to the complementary assets of large companies in manufacturing and 
distribution (Puranam et al., 2006), the acquirer creates value by conquering and scaling 
up the market created by start-up companies. This implies the expected synergies are by 
nature revenue synergies. It was expected that synergies could be realized by coupling 
the customer base of Belganet (which consists mainly of small and medium enterprises) 
and the product of Mobile Everywhere. However, during implementation it became clear 
that this was not as easy as expected. One of the most important reasons why the 
acquisition failed to realize the expected synergies was a misjudgement of these 
expected revenue synergies. During the interviews it became clear that the market 
potential of the technology of Mobile Everywhere was somewhat misjudged. Hence, the 
expected synergies were not realised. There are a number of other reasons why sales 
didn’t increase as predicted. First, selling the product of Mobile Everywhere is 
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completely different from selling traditional Belganet products. These differences in 
sales cycle limited the organizational fit between the two companies, which 
consecutively impedes the effective realization of the expected synergies (Jemison & 
Sitkin, 1986): “We were box movers. Mobile Everywhere is not a box mover. It’s a real 
application. This means that the sales cycle is longer than expected. We thought it would 
take about one month, but in fact it takes on average six months… This also means that we 
don’t have discussions with the persons we are used to discuss with. Up to here we always 
communicated with the CIO or the Chief Telecom Officer and now all of a sudden we have 
to talk to sales people… Our people don’t even have to sell the application. They just have to 
generate leads and the Mobile Everywhere sales people will do the rest. But our sales 
people are not at ease with this…” Another interviewee adds: “Selling a regular Belganet 
product is rather reactive. The customer needs something and we give them what they 
need. Since Mobile Everywhere focuses on sales people in Fast Moving Consumer Goods 
(FMCG) and Pharma, you need to know the world of FMCG and Pharma to determine their 
needs. The sales people at Mobile Everywhere actually come from FMCG and Pharma. They 
need to ask themselves: ‘How can my applications facilitate their processes?’ The process is 
more proactive.” Several interviews with managers from sales confirm this: “Our sales 
people can learn about the technicalities of this product but it’s far more important to 
know the business. You need to know what these sales people in FMCG and Pharma do day 
in day out in order to know how you can be of service for them. Maybe it would be a good 
idea to merge Mobile Everywhere and Belganet people so that they can learn this from 
each other.”. Second, the current market potential of the product was overrated. 
Apparently, the adoption of the Mobile Everywhere product is still in its early adopters 
phase. Also the interviews confirm that the market for the Mobile Everywhere product is 
in its early phase: “There are about 600.000 small and medium enterprises in Belgium. 
Some of them might be interested in the product, but for this type of applications, the small 
and medium enterprises are followers. They follow what happens in the corporate market. 
There may be some early adopters in that market segment but it’s very hard to find them.” 
Someone else confirms: “The acquisition took place too soon. The SME market is not 
ready. If you look at the references within Mobile Everywhere, you notice that most of them 
are large companies. There are a number of small companies, but they are active in the 
same market as the big companies”. The main reason why these misjudgements occurred 
is because the client department, that is the sales and marketing department, was not 
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involved in this stage: “The business case calculated during the due diligence phase does 
not correspond with reality. During the valuation of the opportunities, sales targets were 
set but they were never challenged with sales. What I mean is that they never checked 
whether sales could sell this product? Do we need coaching or real tools to sell this 
product? Is this part of our targets and are these targets realistic? We should have been 
involved in the previous phase to prepare for the hand-over and implementation”. The 
sales and marketing department interacts on a daily basis with the customer and has of 
course a deep understanding of the dynamics, needs and preferences in that market. 
Based on this market knowledge, involvement of the sales and marketing department 
would have led to more accurate estimations of the expected synergies. This would in 
turn have affected the negotiations, since the stand-alone value of the target and the 
synergy value determine the lower and upper margin for negotiation the acquisition 
prices.  
 
The involvement of the client department (i.e. the department that is responsible for the 
implementation, in this case the sales and marketing department) in the due diligence 
phase is also essential for another reason. After the deal was completed, the acquisition 
file was handed over the sales and marketing department, who now became responsible 
for the realization of the synergies. However, it soon became clear that there was a lack 
of commitment and buy-in to implement the synergies effectively. The persons, who 
were responsible for the implementation of the deal, were not involved in the 
preparation of the file. As a result, the marketing and sales team was only involved after 
the closing of the deal. This implies that when the deal was closed the sales & marketing 
targets were not part of the marketing and sales roadmap of that year. One of the 
interviewees puts it as following: “We expected that when Belganet would sell the product 
of Mobile Everywhere, sales would increase a lot. But this didn’t happen the first year 
because it (the product) was not included in the sales targets of the sales guys. These things 
should have been prepared before the hand-over, before signing the deal. And the same 
applies for the marketing roadmap. After the deal was signed, I just received the file and 
they said: go and implement it! So the first thing I did was to check the contract we signed 
and what our commitment was. We checked with all the persons in charge how we could 
put into operation these targets. This went really slow. This really was a change of mind-
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sets… The problem is buy-in. First you need buy-in from the management. This was very 
hard to obtain. The implementation should be a top-down buy-in process. However, after 
the hand-over we did a lot of work to get the targets operational. This really was a top-
down process that took a lot of time, because both the marketing roadmap and sales 
targets were already set, it’s very time-consuming to change this.”  The responsible for the 
market of small and medium enterprises confirms: “There was a lot of resistance to 
implement the case. This is not only the case for the small and medium sized market but 
also for the other market segments. If we include the product of Mobile Everywhere in our 
targets because it is of strategic importance, the people from strategy and business 
development will sure be happy, but they only have an advising role. They have no 
hierarchical power to say: go and implement it!”. These findings imply that if the client 
department was involved sooner in the pre-acquisition phase, the implementation 
would have went off more smoothly. The sales and marketing department would have 
had the time to translate the synergies into sales targets and a marketing roadmap 
which naturally increases the commitment of the sales and marketing department to the 
project. One of the managers of the Strategy and Business Department realizes that it 
was indeed important to effect the commitment of the client department: “The problem 
is that we are not in charge of sales and marketing. It is hard for us to say: guys, you do it! 
We really need to try to involve those people in the file and motivate them to participate”.  
 
To summarize, the client department should have been involved in the selection and due 
diligence phase for two reasons. First, the client department, which is the sales and 
marketing department, is best placed to check the assumptions made in the evaluation 
of the acquisition file, as this is the department where the market knowledge resides. 
Second, involvement of the client department during selection and due diligence secures 
the buy-in of this department and allows them to prepare for implementation. Large 
organizations are typically confronted with heavy processes. Involvement in the earlier 
phases allows them to translate in time the expected synergies in sales targets and 
marketing roadmaps.  
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Figure 7: How selection affects the subsequent phases of the acquisition process 
and the acquisition outcome 
 
 
2.4.1.3. Managing the process as a whole 
The fact that the different components of the acquisition process are interrelated has 
also an impact on the management of the process, more specifically on the team in 
charge. The acquisition process comprises conceptually and operationally different 
analyses done by different people (Jemison & Sitkin, 1986). Analysing the different 
aspects of the acquisition process require different competences, consequently the 
knowledge on the acquisition file is divided among several individuals.  However, the 
knowledge on the acquisition file is mainly tacit by nature. Knowledge literature defines 
tacit knowledge, as opposed to codified knowledge, by its dissociation from practice, 
experience and know-how, it is deeply rooted in action, commitment and involvement in 
a specific context (Nonaka, 1994). Research further indicates that the proportion of an 
organization’s knowledge resources that reside in the minds of people is probably 
somewhere between 80 and 99% - the overwhelming majority of an organization’s 
knowledge thus resides in the heads and hands of their staff. Tacit knowledge is 
incommunicable and difficult to transfer, as opposed to explicit knowledge which is 
easily codified and translated (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995). This lack of explicit 
knowledge in the acquisition process hinders the transfer of knowledge and plays a part 
in the team composition and management. As it is difficult to transfer the knowledge of 
the acquisition file, it becomes critically important to manage the whole acquisition file 
by the same acquisition team. In the case we studied however, there were frequent 
changes in the team responsible for the implementation as is proven by the following 
quotations: “there has been an evolution in the file. ABC, DEF and I are no longer involved. 
I think, nowadays, it is mainly XYZ who manages the file”. Another interviewee confirms 
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“The first matter that didn't go well, was the handover of the file. We only received the file 
once it was signed. Other than that: nothing!! We should have been involved earlier, during 
the preparation of the file, to prepare the hand over". Also the person in charge of the 
selection and negotiations acknowledges that many problems arose from the handover 
of the file: “The implementation, there it all went wrong. I had the drive, but from the 
moment the cheque was handed over, I was no longer in charge. I am not saying that I 
should have done better. But we should see to it that the person, who was in charge of the 
acquisition itself, is also responsible for the implementation and the creation of synergies”. 
Further in the interview he repeats: “The mistakes mainly occurred after the acquisition. 
Then the file was handed over from Business Development to the other team. Moving the 
file from one team to another means losing the dynamics. Just the fact that all the 
knowledge on the file needs to be transferred takes months!”. The situation was even 
deteriorating after the reorganisation of Belganet. Numerous interviewees confirm: 
“Several people that were involved in the acquisition file, were assigned to another 
function”. These findings lead us to believe that team longevity is an important driver of 
acquisition success. Therefore, ideally the acquisition should be managed as a project, 
where one manager has direct access to and responsibility for the work of all those 
people involved and the core group of people are dedicated and physically co-located 
with the leader. These types of teams are called heavyweight teams (Clark & 
Wheelwright, 1992). However, due the specific nature of the acquisition, the roles of the 
different peoples will change. The strategy or M&A department will have leading role 
during the pre-acquisition phase as it is their responsibility to search for and appraise 
potential acquisition targets, however input from the client department is desired for 
the reasons elucidated in the preceding part; their role should be contributing. Once the 
deal is closed and the acquisition reaches its implementation phase, the roles should be 
switched around as the client department becomes responsible for the operational 
management of the acquisition. Nevertheless, the strategy or M&A department should 
still fulfil a contributing role because of the thorough knowledge they have built up 
during the pre-acquisition phase. This model is presented in the figure below.  
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Figure 8: Managing the process as a whole 
 
 
2.5. Discussion 
By studying how the decisions taken and actions executed during the search and 
selection stage affect the implementation of the acquisition and the extent to which the 
expected synergies were realized, we demonstrate that issues of information asymmetry 
are not limited to the preacquisition stage and neither are coordination matters only of 
interest during postacquisition implementation. Further, our study indicates that 
measures taken to alleviate information asymmetry can also foster coordination. 
Similarly, actions undertaken to smoothen the implementation also reduce information 
asymmetry.  
Building on the literature on search, we define search in the context of technology 
acquisitions as the use of joint ventures, alliances, joint development, contract R&D, 
licensing, etc to access new knowledge and information. They serve as learning 
mechanisms allowing the firm to learn and enlarge its knowledge base. Our findings 
illustrate that the use of these mechanisms help to reduce information asymmetry 
between the acquirer and potential acquisition targets, decreasing the chances of 
preacquisition misjudgment. However, these mechanisms also foster coordination as the 
knowledge and the trust that were built during preacquisition collaboration also help 
when implementing the acquisition and realizing the expected synergies.  
Second, we discovered that coordination of the activities of target and acquirer is not 
something that only becomes relevant after the closing of the deal when the 
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postacquisition phase begins. We demonstrate that coordination issues should already 
be considered during the preacquisition stage. For this purpose, involvement of the 
client department during preacquisition is recommended. This not only allows to check 
whether the expected synergies to be created during the postacquisition stage are 
realistic, it also secures the commitment of the client department to the implementation 
of the acquisition. Another advantage of this approach is that it reduces information 
asymmetry between the various parties involved in the acquisition process on the side 
of the acquirer. Our empirical evidence indicates that information asymmetry problems 
do not only occur between acquirer and target but also between the various parties 
involved in the acquisition on the side of the acquirer. Involvement of the client 
department during the selection stage may prevent that the knowledge gathered during 
preacquisition activities gets lost when the file is handed over to the team responsible 
for implementation.  
 
2.6. Conclusion 
Organizations depend more and more upon their ability to access and exploit external 
knowledge to build up and sustain competitive advantage (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). 
Technology acquisitions are just one mode of accessing and exploiting this external 
knowledge, however both business practice and literature indicate that technology 
acquisitions have become an important means to obtain access to innovative 
technologies (Vanhaverbeke et al., 2002; Puranam et al., 2006). But despite the 
abundant literature on technology acquisitions, we still lack a deeper insight in the 
entire process of managing acquisitions, from strategy definition to implementation and 
performance. There are a few papers that studied the phenomenon from a process 
perspective (such as Jemison & Sitkin, 1986, Birkinshaw et al., 2000; Ranft & Lord, 
2002), yet their focus is mainly limited to the integration process. This paper addressed 
this gap in literature by looking at the entire acquisition process and examined how this 
process affects acquisition performance. More specifically, we investigated how the 
different process components are interrelated and how decisions and managerial 
actions made during the search and selection phase affect the implementation and the 
acquisition outcome. We used an in-depth case analysis to gain a deeper understanding 
of the acquisition process and its impact. The interviews revealed that both search and 
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selection are crucial in preparing the implementation of the acquisition, as they 
moderate some of the typical selection problems (such as information asymmetry) and 
implementation problems (such as resistance of the personnel). First, we investigated 
the impact of search on the subsequent stages of the acquisition process. We defined 
search as accessing external information and knowledge on new technologies by means 
of alliances, corporate venture capital, and joint ventures. We found that search 
contributes to acquisition performance through two mechanisms: increased market and 
technological knowledge and trust. On the one hand, the market and technical 
information gathered during the search activities lowers the level of information 
asymmetry and leads to better selection decisions, which in turns contributes to 
acquisition performance. On the other hand, these search activities allow building up a 
relationship with the potential target. The trust established during this cooperation 
leads to decreased resistance with the employees of the target firm and also facilitates 
the process of negotiating the deal, which again contributes to acquisition performance. 
Second, we explored how decisions taken during the selection and due diligence process 
influence the subsequent stages of the acquisition. We identified involvement of the 
client department as a crucial success factor in the acquisition process for the following 
reasons. First, the client department is best suited to check a number of assumptions, 
especially the assumptions related to the market, such as the adoption of the technology 
in the market and the sales cycle, for this knowledge is an important input factor in the 
calculation of the synergy value of the deal and therefore affects the negotiations and 
acquisition performance. Second, the involvement of client department during the pre-
acquisition stages also secures buy-in and the commitment of this department to 
acquisition, thereby reducing the resistance of the employees to the acquisition and 
facilitating implementation. Finally, we discovered that the interrelatedness of these 
process components has implications for the team that is managing the acquisition. In 
particular, the interviews revealed that acquisitions might benefit from project 
management, where one dedicated team is responsible for the management of the file.  
Together, these findings raise a number of issues that up until now, received limited 
attention in the research of technology acquisitions.  
This paper makes a number of contributions, both on a conceptual and an empirical 
level. First, we add to the literature on technology acquisitions. By jointly studying the 
preacquisition and postacquisition stage, we integrate insights of the economics of 
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information view with the organizational view to provide a more complete picture of the 
acquisition process. The conceptual frameworks developed in this paper demonstrate 
that information asymmetry issues are at play both in the pre- and postacquisition stage.  
Further, these information asymmetries not only exist between acquirer and target but 
also occur between the various teams of acquiring company. Correspondingly, 
coordination problems are not limited to the postacquisition stage but should also be 
considered during the preacquisition stages. To manages these problems related to 
information asymmetry and coordination, our paper makes proposes two mechanisms 
taking in account the flow of the acquisition process. Doing so we illustrate that 
acquisitions are a path-dependent process as preacquisition decisions affect 
postacquisition implementation and vice versa.  Second, this paper illustrates the 
importance of proper knowledge management during the acquisition process. Much of 
the knowledge gathered during the acquisition process is tacit by nature. Consequently 
managing the knowledge transfer between the various teams responsible for the 
management of the acquisition within the acquirer is equally important as managing 
knowledge transfer between acquirer and target. In addition to these conceptual 
contributions, this study makes a practical contribution. The insights developed in this 
study could help both the acquirer and the target to optimize their acquisition strategy 
and performance.  
 
As any study, also this one is characterized by a number of shortcomings. First, as we 
study only one acquisition in great depth, the external validity of our findings is 
questionable. Additional research is required to explore the proposed mechanisms in 
other contexts and sectors. In a first stage, more case studies are recommendable. Later 
on this should be followed by statistical testing to ensure external validity. Further 
research is also required to gain a deeper insight in the proposed mechanisms and to 
verify the discovered relationships. Another shortcoming of this study is that we were 
not able to study the process real-time. Though we took some measure to reduce 
potential bias due to retrospective thinking, real-time studies would yield even more 
fine-grained grained results.  
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3. Young High Tech Firms, Resources and Trade Sales 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
The most likely exit for a VC investing in a YTBF is a trade sale. An increasing number of 
scholars have investigated the determinants of a successful acquisition. However, most 
studies analyse acquisitions from the perspective of the acquirer and focus on 
managerial actions before and after acquisition that are likely to increase acquisition 
success. We adopt the perspective of the YTBF and analyze to what extent managerial 
actions undertaken by these firms impact its likelihood of being acquired and its 
eventual acquisition return. We build on insights from resource-based theory to develop 
hypotheses on the impact of resources on acquisition likelihood and return. In a sample 
of 285 UK YTBFs, we find that patents and the hiring of experienced top managers result 
in a higher acquisition likelihood, while revenues and partnerships contribute to 
acquisition return. 
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3.1. Introduction 
The commercialization strategy of a young technology-based firm (YTBF) is a crucial 
determinant of its success (Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004; Kasch & Dowling, 2008). Gans 
and Stern (2003) extended Teece’s (1986) framework and showed that the 
commercialization strategy of a YTBF will depend on the appropriability regime of the 
technology on which the firm is based and the distribution of complementary assets in 
the product market it wants to target. In many cases these complementary assets are 
tightly held by a few incumbents and it is almost impossible for the YTBF to enter that 
market. In such circumstances, a well-functioning “market for technology”, 
characterized by a tight appropriability regime, can enable the YTBF to commercialize 
its technology through selling licenses, performing contract research, or by collaborating 
with a large company which owns the complementary assets to turn the technology into 
a product (Hsu, 2006).  
 
Although the markets for technology are important to generate revenues, their 
functioning is dependent on the appropriability regime. Even in tight appropriability 
regimes, these markets are unlikely to generate the revenues and growth prospects a 
typical VC is interested in (Clarysse et al., 2009). Instead, it is typically the potential 
trade sale of the YTBF to an incumbent which attracts the attention of the venture 
capitalist (Ritter, Gao & Zhu, 2011). Gans, Hsu and Stern (2002) consider “cooperation 
with and acquisition by large incumbents” as a potential outcome when the 
appropriability regime is tight and a necessary outcome if the complementary assets are 
tightly held. However, they combine cooperation and acquisition as one construct and 
only focus on the impact of environmental factors on the probability of cooperation and 
acquisition, without making any distinction between different YTBFs operating in 
similar environments. Understanding the managerial actions which lead to a successful 
trade sale (i.e. acquisition of the YTBF by an incumbent) is thus an important step in 
analyzing the strategic choices that a YTBF has to commercialize its products in complex 
environments (Clarysse et al., 2009).  
To analyze management’s strategic actions that optimize both the likelihood the YTBF 
will be acquired and the acquisition return, we build on insights from the resource-
 80 
 
based view of the firm (Barney, Ketchen & Wright, 2011; Hoopes, Madsen & Walker, 
2003). Resource-based theory focuses on explaining the characteristics of resources and 
capabilities that contribute to a firm’s competitive advantage (Hoskisson, Hitt, Wan & 
Yiu, 1999), thereby providing guidance to managers seeking to build and exploit a 
competitive resource base. YTBFs in possession of a portfolio of valuable, rare, 
imperfectly imitable and substitutable resources not only create a competitive 
advantage for themselves, but also become attractive acquisition targets in the eyes of 
the incumbents in the industry. More specifically, we investigate to what extent social, 
human and technical resources contribute to a YTBF’s attractiveness as an acquisition 
target, the likelihood of acquisition and to what extent revenue generating capabilities 
contribute to the acquisition return.  While technical resources and capabilities are the 
main assets to be sold in case of an acquisition of a YTBF (Puranam, Singh & Zollo, 
2006), we argue that human and social resources are also required to become an 
attractive acquisition target. Much of the value of technology ventures resides in the 
human capital of the company as the knowledge of YTBFs, which is typically tacit and 
socially complex, is embodied in the founders and key personnel of the firm (Graebner, 
2004). The experience of the hired top managers helps the YTBF to develop and grow 
and attract the interest of potential investors. Social capital also contributes to the 
attractiveness of YTBFs as acquisition targets as it allows them to overcome resource 
constraints and acquire knowledge and resources that would otherwise be unavailable 
(Colombo, Grilli & Piva, 2006). Thus, in addition to technical resources, human and social 
resources are needed to bring the YTBF to a maturity level which attracts the attention 
of potential acquirers. Furthermore, we argue that the price paid for a YTBF will reflect 
the revenue generating capabilities of the YTBF. YTBFs typically encounter difficulties 
when transforming their rent potential into profits (Durand, Bruyaka& Mangematin, 
2008). However, when they are able to demonstrate their rent appropriation by 
generating revenues and entering into commercial partnerships this is likely to make 
them more attractive acquisition targets resulting in higher acquisition returns.  
Empirically, we examine the hazard of being acquired and the acquisition return, 
defined as the difference between acquisition price and amount of venture capital 
received, divided by age at exit, in a sample of 285 British young technology-based firms. 
Our results show that acquisition likelihood is affected by  the number of experienced 
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top managers and the patent stock a YTBF has, while acquisition return is influenced by 
revenues, number of commercial and research partners and patent stock.  
Our analysis makes a number of contributions. First,  by focusing on technology 
acquisitions, we extend the literature on  cooperative commercialization strategies 
which predominantly focuses on alliances with companies owning the complementary 
assets as a route to market (e.g. Colombo, Grilli & Piva, 2006; Rothaermel & Deeds, 
2004). We analyze the strategic actions which make the strategic choice of a trade sale 
more likely and which create value to increase the success of a trade sale. In doing so, we 
go beyond the literature that analyzes acquisitions from the perspective of the acquirer 
to consider the perspective of the YTBF being acquired. Second, our study is one of the 
first distinguishing between the factors influencing acquisition likelihood and those 
driving acquisition return. Conceptually, our results seem to indicate the existence of 
various types of technology acquisitions depending on the strength of the 
appropriability regime. When YTBFs can protect their technology with a strong patent 
portfolio, having commercial partnerships to demonstrate their commercial potential is 
not necessary as it has a negative impact on acquisition return. Conversely, YTBFs with 
no patents do benefit from having commercial partnerships as they contribute to the 
acquisition return. This seems to suggest that a company lacking in patents to protect its 
technology should take its venture one step further along the company development 
cycle and prove commercial viability by establishing commercial partnerships. Third, 
our analyses serve to extend the limited literature on exits from YTBFs by shifting the 
focus to trade sales, which are a more frequent exit option than IPOs. Ritter et al. (2011) 
argue that this is a structural shift which is likely to remain for the following reason. As 
innovation speed has increased to the benefit of large firms, a small firm is worth more 
as part of a larger organization than as an independent firm. By being part of a larger 
organization, small firms can benefit from economies of scope and bring new technology 
to market faster.  Finally, our findings are relevant for managers seeking to optimize 
their chances of a successful trade sale by highlighting those strategic actions that 
contribute to acquisition likelihood and acquisition return.  
This paper unfolds as follows. In the next section, we first provide a review of previous 
research on commercialization strategies in general and technology acquisitions 
specifically. We then build a theoretical framework and hypotheses drawing on 
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resource-based theory. We argue that acquisition likelihood is determined by the 
presence of technical, social and human resources, while acquisition return depends on 
the capabilities  of the YTBF to generate revenues. Third, we describe the unique sample 
we collected and propose the methodology used to operationalize the constructs. 
Fourth, we test the effect of various resources and capabilities on the acquisition return, 
controlling for the likelihood of being acquired and discuss the results. Finally, we 
discuss the contribution of the paper and further avenues for research.  
 
3.2. Literature review 
Arora, Fosfuri and Gambardella (2002) define markets for technology as “transactions 
for the use, diffusion and creation of technology. This includes transactions involving full 
technology packages and patent licensing as well as transactions involving knowledge 
that is not patentable. These transactions can take different forms, from pure licensing 
to complicated collaborative agreements.” The literature on markets for technology has 
primarily focused on the circumstances under which firms will engage in licensing 
(Arora, Fosfuri and Gambardella, 2001; Fosfuri, 2006). Increases in the effectiveness of 
patent protection lead to increased licensing propensity, but only when the firm lacks 
specialized complementary assets required to commercialize new technologies (Arora 
and Ceccagnoli, 2006).   
Firm size has also been found to be an important determining factor in explaining patent 
licensing (Gambardella, Giuri and Luzzi, 2007). However, even in well-functioning 
markets for technology, the revenues which YTBFs generate through licensing and 
contract research may not be sufficient to support profitable growth (Clarysse, et al., 
2009). This literature has ignored trade sales as a potential commercialization strategy  
for YTBFs in the market for technology. By selling to an incumbent in the industry, the 
YTBF gains access to the complementary assets necessary to speed their product to the 
market and/or increase market share. This generates returns for the owners of the 
YTBF, either in the shape of earn-outs (linked to the performance of the acquisition 
target), shares or cash. 
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A parallel stream of research has focused on the commercialization strategies of 
innovative start-ups firms, building on the seminal work of Teece (1986). This research 
has shown that  the appropriability regime in the form of  strong intellectual property 
rights, the presence of intermediaries such as venture capitalists and high levels of sunk 
costs of market entry increase the chance that the start-up will cooperate with holders 
of complementary assets (Gans and Stern, 2003, Gans et al., 2002). Cooperation includes 
both acquisition by the incumbent firm and collaboration with the incumbent. Gans and 
Stern (2003) build on these results to develop a framework that guides the innovative 
start-up in choosing the appropriate commercialization strategy. Only in the scenario of 
weak appropriability regimes and unimportant complementary assets that are widely 
spread among incumbents is a commercialization strategy which targets acquisition 
(and cooperation) an unlikely scenario. As a result of these findings, Aggarwal and Hsu 
(2009) and Kasch and Dowling (2008) have further explored the antecedents of 
cooperative strategies. However, these studies either do not explicitly distinguish 
acquisitions from strategic alliances or other forms of collaboration or they specifically 
exclude acquisitions from the study (eg. Hsu, 2006; Kasch & Dowling, 2008). 
 
In addition to the unclear role which acquisitions play, prior studies have also 
predominantly focused on how environmental factors impact the most likely 
commercialization strategy, thereby overlooking the differences which might exist 
between companies that operate in a similar environmental space. As a result, these 
studies leave no room for managerial agency and neglect to investigate which 
managerial actions help in realizing the selected commercialization strategy. This is a 
major shortcoming in the literature which focuses on value creation strategies. To 
compensate, we combine insights from the literature on commercialization strategies of 
YTBFS with insights from the resource-based view of the firm. The resource-based view 
of the firm states that the competitive advantage and thus success of a firm critically 
depends upon the bundle of resources at the firm’s disposal (Wernerfelt, 1984). These 
resources only create above average value if the following conditions are met: the 
resources are valuable, rare, imperfectly imitable and not substitutable (Barney, 1991). 
Applying these principles in the context of trade sales, implies that the acquisition 
success of YTBFs critically depends upon the resources the firm has acquired. The more 
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valuable, rare, imperfectly imitable and substitutable the resources of the YTBF, the 
higher are the chances that the firm will be able to realize a trade sale on favorable 
terms (i.e. a higher return). In the next section, we develop five hypotheses on how the 
YTBF’s resources and capabilities contribute to the chances of a YTBF realizing a 
successful trade sale. 
 
3.3. Hypothesis development 
While the literature on markets for technology and commercialization strategies of 
young technology-based firms has largely focused on environmental factors influencing 
the chosen commercialization strategy, the resource-based view (RBV) offers a 
framework which allows us to evaluate how YTBFs should behave in order to be 
successful in their chosen commercialization strategy. Central to the RBV is the 
argument that differences in performance between companies can be explained by 
differences in acquired resources. YTBFs seeking to be acquired should optimize their 
resource base so that it becomes valuable for the future acquirer. A resource can be 
defined as an asset or input to production both tangible and intangible that an 
organization owns, controls, or has access to on a semi-permanent basis (Helfat & 
Peteraf, 2003). In the late nineties, resource-based theory was extended to dynamic 
markets and includes capabilities besides resources as a source of competitive 
advantages (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). Organizational capabilities can be defined as 
“the ability of an organization to perform a coordinated set of tasks, utilizing 
organizational resources for the purpose of achieving a particular result” (Helfat & 
Peteraf, 2003, p 999). This implies resources are only valuable when the organization 
has  the capabilities to deploy those resources. 
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3.3.1. Technical resources 
Technological resources constitute the core of a firm’s competitive advantage. They 
comprise an organization’s patents, technological knowledge and production skills that 
are valuable and difficult to imitate by competing firms (Lee, Lee & Pennings, 2001). 
These technical resources and capabilities are even more imperative for YTBFs (Shrader 
& Simon, 1997). Consequently, patenting is an important way for YTBFs to establish 
themselves in the technological domain in which they operate. Patenting allows the 
YTBF to disclose information about its most important asset without the risk of losing 
the returns on its inventions. The ability to stake technological claims is a critically 
important for a young venture’s future potential (Baum & Silverman, 2004). In R&D 
intensive and innovative environments, patents are an important indicator of the 
appropriability of future returns of innovation (Teece, 1986). Not patenting may be seen 
as forgoing the economic returns of one’s invention and inappropriate behavior. 
Intellectual property protected by patents confers value creation by allowing the YTBF 
to solely commercialize its technological inventions, seize market opportunities and 
differentiate themselves from incumbents (Lee, Lee & Pennings, 2001). Venture 
capitalists view patenting as desirable behavior (Haeussler, Harhoff and Mueller, 2009), 
because it provides evidence that the firm is at a certain stage of development and has 
defined a certain market niche (Lemley, 2001). Independent evaluation by patent offices 
may lend credibility to the patent itself and to the company in possession of the focal 
patent. It indicates that the YTBF properly manages its technology; it serves as a sign 
that the firm has matured efficiently to consider various commercialization options and 
that the firm is willing to invest in the protection of its technology (Haeussler et al., 
2009). As such, patents may provide YTBFS with an important competitive advantages 
as it excludes other companies from commercializing their technology. Patents indicate 
that the firm has technology that may be valuable to potential buyers, thus increasing 
the likelihood of being acquired and the acquisition return. 
Hypothesis 1a: The more patents a YTBF has, the higher the likelihood that it will be 
acquired. 
Hypothesis 1b: The more patents a YTBF has, the higher the acquisition return. 
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3.3.2. Human resources 
Human resources include the training, experience, judgment, intelligence, relationships 
and insights of the individual managers and employees in the firm. Within the 
entrepreneurship literature it is widely accepted that qualified founders and top 
managers play a crucial role in the success of the venture (Colombo & Grilli, 2005; 
Cooper et al., 1994). For YTBFs the entrepreneur is the most critical source of human 
capital within the firm. Welbourne and Andrews (1996) indicate that firm-specific 
human capital in new firms is embodied in the management know-how and experience 
of the founding team. The knowledge about the sector and management embodied in the 
entrepreneur permits the YTBF to assess various commercialization strategies and the 
appropriateness of actions to pursue those strategies (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). 
Entrepreneurs lacking such knowledge can hire experienced people to complement the 
management team. Hellman and Puri (2000; 2002) highlight the importance of 
obtaining sufficient executive turnover in order to increase professionalization within 
new ventures and to enhance growth. Consequently, the hiring of top managers with 
extensive experience in the field reflects the firm’s effort to set up a qualified team with 
the skills and capabilities necessary to turn the venture into a success, resulting in a 
higher likelihood of being acquired and higher acquisition return.  
Hypothesis 2a: The more top managers the YTBF has been able to hire, the higher the 
likelihood of being acquired. 
Hypothesis 2a:Given the acquisition likelihood, the more top managers the YTBF has been 
able to hire, the higher the likelihood of being acquired. 
 
3.3.3. Social capital  
Various researchers in the social capital literature have demonstrated the importance of 
networks and partnerships for firm performance (Gabbay & Leenders, 1999). As firms 
typically represent only a fraction of the value chain, they depend upon other parties in 
the value chain to acquire resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1979). Consequently, 
organizations should develop strategies that allow them to build and exploit external 
relationships (Lee et al., 2001). In addition, social capital resources provide important 
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access to knowledge acquisition and opportunities to learn from partners and contacts, 
which in turn allows the firm to mobilize additional resources that would otherwise be 
beyond reach.  Alliances are particularly critical for the success of YTBFs as in their early 
stages YTBFs are unlikely to dispose of all the resources and capabilities necessary to 
compete with incumbents (Colombo & Piva, 2008). Alliances or partnerships allow the 
YTBF to complement its resource base (Pisano, 1991; Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996) 
by providing access to the alliance partner’s technological competences, knowledge of 
relevant markets and complementary assets needed for the successful 
commercialization of their technology (Colombo, Grilli & Murtinu, 2009). Partnerships 
thus contribute to a firm’s competitive advantage thereby increasing its attractiveness 
as acquisition target. Therefore, we hypothesize:  
Hypothesis 3a: The more partners YTBFs have, the higher the likelihood of being 
acquired. 
Hypothesis 3b: Given acquisition likelihood, the more partners YTBFs have, the higher 
the acquisition return. 
 
3.3.4. Revenue generating capabilities 
While the above three types of resources help the YTBF to create visibility among future 
acquirers and increase acquisition likelihood, these resources are not sufficient to result 
in a high acquisition return. When determining the price to be paid for the acquisition of 
a YTBF,  the acquirer will consider two things. First, the acquirer will consider the extent 
to which this acquisition will contribute to its revenues. Secondly, the acquirer considers 
the level of uncertainty associated with these revenues. In the process of technology 
commercialization and generating return, YTBFs face two challenges, namely rent 
generation and rent appropriation. YTBFs typically encounter difficulties when 
transforming their rent potential into profits (Durand, Bruyaka & Mangematin, 2008). 
Rent generation thus does not necessarily result in rent appropriation. A YTBF with the 
capabilities to generate revenues thus reflects the ability to transform its rent potential 
into rent appropriations, which in turn will be reflected in the acquisition return. 
Therefore, we argue, the higher the revenues generated by the YTBF, the higher the 
acquisition return. 
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Yet, not all YTBF are able to generate revenues. Technology commercialization is a 
complex process, entailing various steps such as acquiring ideas, augmenting them with 
complementary knowledge, developing and manufacturing saleable goods and selling 
those goods in the market (Mitchel & Singh, 1996: p 170). This process is characterized 
by high levels of uncertainty. Exploitation or commercial alliances tend to bridge the gap 
between rent generation and rent appropriation as they provide the YTBF with access to 
the complementary assets needed to bring its product to the market (Durand, Bruyaka & 
Mangematin, 2008). Hence, the more commercial partners a YTBF has, the more 
channels to market it has, and the higher the acquisition return. In addition, these 
commercial partnerships might indicate that the technology of the YTBF is closer to 
market, thereby decreasing the level of market uncertainty that still exists and 
contributing to the acquisition return. Hence:   
Hypothesis 4: Given acquisition likelihood, the more revenues YTBFs have, the higher 
the acquisition return. 
Hypothesis 5: Given acquisition likelihood, the more commercial partners  YTBFs have,  
the higher the acquisition return. 
 
3.4. Method 
3.4.1. Sample and data collection 
We define technology acquisitions as “the acquisition of YTBFs made by large 
established firms to graft the acquired technological capabilities onto their own 
resource bases” (Puranam et al., 2006: 263). For purposes of this study, YTBFs are 
defined as companies founded between 1991 and 2004 which develop and 
commercialize new products or services based upon proprietary technology or skills 
(Heirman & Clarysse, 2007). We take 2004 as our end point in order to allow sufficient 
time for exit by trade sale to take place. We begin the identification process of 
technology acquisitions from a sample of YTBFs instead of using a conventional 
acquisition database since these are less likely to pick up smaller private acquisitions. 
The VentureSource database from Dow Jones provides such a database. Our sample 
frame includes YTBFs located in the UK that received venture capital. We decided to 
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focus on VC-backed companies as these companies have to specific objective of realizing 
an exit. We identified a sample of 334 companies from this database. We were able to 
confirm valuation figures for 162 companies. Since we test for the likelihood of being 
acquired, a control sample was added to this original sample. Following Megginson and 
Weiss (1991) a matched pair methodology was used to construct a similar sample of 
non-acquired companies. Each acquired company was matched with a similar non-
acquired company on the basis of the following criteria: year of founding and sector 
classification. To match the companies as closely as possible, we used the three-digit 
sector classification. If no companies matched that profile, sector classification was 
extended to match the two-digit classification. The matched companies were selected at 
random from a list of all companies that met the required characteristics. All companies 
in the matched sample were still active in the year of data collection, bankruptcies and 
IPOs were excluded from the analysis. This implies all companies are at risk of being 
acquired.  
 
3.4.2. Dependent Variables 
We operationalize two dependent variables. Only a fraction of investments succeed in 
realizing an exit through trade sale.. Therefore, a first step in realizing a successful exit is 
being acquired. We use the likelihood of being acquired as our first measure of exit 
success. The main goal of possibly realizing an exit is to generate a return. It is well 
known that VC firms and investors of technology ventures reap most of their benefits by 
exit either through IPO or trade sale (Cumming & MacIntosh, 2003). Consequently, we 
use acquisition return as our second measure of exit success.  The two dependent 
variables are defined as follows:  
Acquisition likelihood: this is a dummy variable indicating whether the young 
technology-based venture has been acquired (=1) or not (=0). 
Acquisition return: We calculated the annual return to construct the depend variable. For 
this purpose we subtracted the total amount of venture capital financing received from 
the price paid for acquisition. The result was divided by the age of the firm in year of 
acquisition to generate acquisition return numbers. 
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3.4.3. Independent variables 
3.4.3.1. Human, social and technical resources 
To identify the extent  of resources in YTBFs the following sources were consulted. First, 
the company profiles provided by VentureSource contained some information about the 
partnerships of the company. However, these data seemed incomplete, therefore we 
used two additional resources to measure the amounts in each of those resource 
categories. First, we checked the company website for information on the presence of 
partnerships, hired top managers and patents. In order to make sure that we only 
included those social and human capital resources that were present within the 
company before acquisition, we used an archived version of the company’s website3. 
Second, we screened the press releases of the ventures to identify partnerships and 
hired guns. For this purpose, the database provided by Factiva was used. Detailed 
information about patents granted to the YTBFs was collected from Delphion. 
Human capital (Hired Top Managers): this measure reflects the number of ‘hired guns’ of 
the company. It measures the number of top managers with more than 10 years of 
experience in the focal sector that were hired by the YTBF (Heirman & Clarysse, 2005). 
We counted the total number of experienced top managers that were hired by the YTBF 
from start-up until year of acquisition. 
Social Capital: social capital is measured as the total number of partnerships 
communicated by the YTBF up until the year of acquisition. We consider three types of 
partners: affiliations with other companies (Number of Commercial Partners), 
affiliations with universities and research institutes (Number of Research Partners), 
affiliations with venture capitalists. 
Technical resources (Patent Stock): this is measured by the patent stock of the YTBF. 
Patent stock is defined as the total number of applications filed by a focal firm that 
eventually resulted in a successful award of a patent (Hsu & Ziedonis, 2011; Haeussler et 
al., 2009;  Heeley et al.). The Delphion database was used to perform the patent search. 
Of course only those patents that were assigned to the company were taken in account. 
Because the distribution of this variable was skewed, a log transformation was 
performed.  
                                                          
3
 www.archive.org provides a tool that allows accessing older versions of a company website. 
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3.4.3.2. Control variables   
In the equation predicting acquisition likelihood the following control variables were 
included. First, we controlled for the experience of the lead VC who invested in the 
company with trade sales (VC Trade Sale Success). Clarysse et al. (2011) find that trade 
sale experience of the lead VC increases the chances of a company being acquired. We 
also controlled for size (Number of Employees) and age of the company (Age). In 
addition, the number of financing rounds (Number of Financing Rounds) and amount of 
VC financing (VC Amount) were included as controls, as both variables are a potential 
indicator of the quality of the venture and thus the likelihood of being acquired (Nahata, 
2008). Regarding the acquisition return equation, we again include the number of 
financing rounds and amount of VC financing as they might reflect the underlying quality 
of the venture and subsequently acquisition return. Second, we included a number of 
sector dummies (Biotech dummy, physical science dummy and ICT dummy), as 
industries differ regarding effectiveness of appropriability regimes, market size, entry 
cost and average performance influencing the price an young venture is likely to receive 
at acquisition.  
 
3.4.4. Heckman selection model 
To test our hypotheses, we first analyze the acquisition propensity of a YTBF (i.e. a 
categorical variable indicating whether the YTBF was able to realize a trade sale or not). 
Second, for those companies that have been acquired, we investigate which factors 
influence acquisition return. To predict the acquisition return, we need to correct our 
sample for those ventures that have not been acquired because for these ventures, 
obviously, no acquisition price is available (Cochrane, 2005). The Heckman correction 
allows us to control for such a selection bias. Furthermore, the Heckman procedure 
allows us to estimate both equations – the one estimating acquisition likelihood and the 
one estimating acquisition return – simultaneously.  However, this procedure requires 
different variables for each equation. More precisely, we need at least one variable in the 
selection equation which does not predict acquisition return. The selection of this 
variable should be driven by theory. Following Clarysse et al. (2011) our model includes 
the trade sale experience of the lead VC for this purpose.  
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3.5. Results 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the entire sample summarizing the 
characteristics of the companies in year of acquisition. It also provides a correlation 
matrix. Although some of the independent variables show significant correlations, the 
absence of high levels of correlation between the independent variables implies that 
multicollinearity is probably not an issue in this analysis. This is confirmed by 
calculation of the variance inflation factors. The low level of correlation between VC 
Trade Sale Success on one hand and acquisition return on the other indicates that this 
measure meets the requirement of exogeneity and thus can be used to create the 
selection correction lambda. 
 
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics distinguishing between the acquired and the 
non-acquired firms. Most notable are the differences in terms of VC financing. The lead 
VC of the acquired firms has on average 24% trade sales in his portfolio, while the lead 
VC of the non-acquired firms has about 19% trade sales in his portfolio. Furthermore, 
the acquired firms receive on average more VC financing, 13.3 million Euros for the 
acquired firms versus 10.5 million Euros for acquired firms, in fewer financing rounds, 
2.50 versus 2.98. Finally, the acquired firms generate on average almost twice as much 
revenues as the non-acquired firms. The acquired firms realize a mean turnover of 12.7 
million Euros while the non-acquired firms realize merely 6.4 million Euros. In the next 
section, we investigate whether these differences explain the likelihood of being 
acquired. 
Table 2: Summary statistics 
 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Correlation (* Significant at 0.05 level)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
1. Acquisition Return 4.47 16.49 1.00
2. Acquisition Dummy 0.55 0.50 .* 1.00
3. VC Trade Sale Success 0.22 0.13 0.01 0.18* 1.00
4. Age 8.10 4.58 -0.21* -0.02 0.07 1.00
5. Number of Employees 102.69 368.10 0.03 0.08 0.02 0.25* 1.00
6. Number of Financing Rounds 2.72 1.67 -0.07 -0.14* 0.06 0.04 -0.04 1.00
7. VC Amount 12.00 18.05 -0.02 0.08 0.17* 0.08 0.16* 0.32* 1.00
8. ASO dummy 0.11 0.31 -0.07 0.09 0.11 -0.07 -0.06 0.17* 0.16* 1.00
9. Patent Stock 0.34 0.74 -0.05 0.05 0.03 0.07 -0.02 0.36* 0.36* 0.27* 1.00
10. Hired Top Managers 0.83 1.38 -0.04 0.11 0.09 0.05 -0.01 0.20* 0.12* 0.15* 0.05 1.00
11. Number of Commerial  Partners 4.95 6.97 0.46* -0.02 0.12* 0.09 0.16* 0.22* 0.13* 0.02 0.05 0.37* 1.00
12. Number of Research Partners 0.25 0.76 0.15 0.04 -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 0.18* 0.10 0.19* 0.32* 0.00 0.01 1.00
13. Number of Syndicate Partners 3.20 2.68 0.00 -0.01 0.19* -0.04 -0.06 0.53* 0.50* 0.32* 0.40* 0.27* 0.20* 0.19* 1.00
14. Revenues 9.87 25.65 0.12 0.12* 0.04 0.07 0.29* -0.15* 0.15* -0.06 -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 -0.06 -0.06 1.00
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Table 3: comparison of acquired and not acquired firms 
 
 
Table 4 presents the results of the two stage Heckman selection model to predict the 
likelihood of being acquired and the acquisition return. Model 1 in table 4 gives on 
overview of the results for the base model, while model 2 presents the results of the 
hypothesis. Overall, this model is strongly significant (Wald chi-square = 94.97, p < 
0.0001).  
 
3.5.1. Likelihood of being acquired 
First we explore the results for the dependent variable “likelihood of being acquired”. 
The selection equations of Table 3 provides a deeper insight into the drivers of being 
acquired. The table confirms that the experience of the VC in trade sales (p < 0.01) is a 
crucial driver of the likelihood of being acquired. As this variable is not significantly 
related to acquisition return, it also meets the exogeneity requirements for use in the 
selection correction. Among the control variables, only the Number of Financing rounds 
have a significant impact, which is negative (p < 0.01). Concerning technical resources, 
measured as the number of patents granted to the YTBF, as hypothesized a positive 
impact on acquisition likelihood is noted. This impact is significant at the 0.05 level, 
thereby supporting hypothesis 1a. Regarding the number of Hired Top Managers, we 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
1. Acquisition Return 4.47 16.49 n.a. n.a.
2. Acquisition Dummy 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
3. VC Trade Sale Success 0.24 0.13 0.19 0.13
4. Age 8.01 4.52 8.20 4.66
5. Number of Employees 130.88 484.26 68.36 116.65
6. Number of Financing Rounds 2.50 1.47 2.98 1.86
7. VC Amount 13.26 20.52 10.46 14.41
8. ASO dummy 0.13 0.34 0.08 0.26
9. Patent Stock 0.37 0.74 0.30 0.73
10. Hired Top Managers 0.97 1.50 0.66 1.21
11. Number of Commerial Partners 4.85 7.81 5.08 5.82
12. Number of Research Partners 0.27 0.73 0.22 0.80
13. Number of Syndicate Partners 3.17 2.60 3.24 2.78
14. Revenues 12.70 32.50 6.42 12.44
Acquired Companies Non Acquired Companies
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find a significant positive effect on acquisition likelihood (p < 0.05), supporting 
hypothesis 2a. Finally, we tested the relationship between various types of partnerships 
and the likelihood of being acquired. While commercial and syndicate partners have a 
negative sign and research partners have a positive sign, the coefficients are however 
not significant, and therefore we do not find support for hypothesis 3a. 
Table 4: Heckman Selection Model 
 
 
3.5.2. Acquisition Return 
The regression models in table 3 present the results for the hypotheses on acquisition 
return.  Among the control variables, only Age (p < 0.01) has a significant and negative 
effect on acquisition return. Although patents had a positive impact on acquisition 
likelihood, the impact on acquisition return is negative, but weakly significant (p<0.10), 
thus we find no support for hypothesis 1b. In contrast to hypothesis 2b, Hired Top 
Manager have a significant but negative impact on acquisition return (p < 0.01). 
Regarding revenues we find the expected positive effect, significant at the 0.05 level, 
thereby supporting hypothesis 4. Further, it appears that regarding acquisition return, 
the firm’s partnerships become more important. All three types of partners have a 
Heckman two step
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
VC Trade Sale Success 1.578 ** 0.616 1.795 *** 0.631
Biotech dummy -2.154 * 4.685 -1.049 4.213
Physical Science dummy -0.364 4.390 2.291 3.797
ICT dummy 2.348 3.402 0.499 2.868
Age -0.976 *** 0.297 -0.756 *** 0.245
Number of Employees 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.003 0.000 0.000 -0.002 0.003
Number of Financing Rounds -0.142 *** 0.051 0.655 1.385 -0.162 *** 0.060 -0.875 1.187
VC Amount 0.012 * 0.007 -0.048 0.099 0.010 0.007 -0.028 0.072
ASO dummy 0.623 ** 0.293 -6.111 6.186 0.513 0.315 -5.364 4.533
Revenues 0.068 ** 0.034
Number of Commercial Partners -0.015 0.012 1.254 *** 0.168
Number of Research Partners 0.085 0.118 4.681 *** 1.636
Number of Syndicate Partners -0.037 0.044 0.618 0.595
Patent Stock 0.288 ** 0.146 -3.545368 * 2.096
Hired Top Managers 0.142 ** 0.066 -2.777283 *** 1.004
Constant -0.007 0.193 17.523 * 8.219 0.006 0.196 9.905 6.168
Mills Lambda -10.025 -4.024156
Observations 285 285
Censored observations 123 123
Uncensored observations 162 162
Wald Chi2 12.95 94.97
Selection Regression Selection Regression
Model 1 Model 2
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positive impact on acquisition return. Most importantly, the number of commercial 
partnerships positively affects acquisition return with a p-value below 0.01, thereby 
supporting hypothesis 5.  
 
3.6. Discussion 
We argued that acquisitions of YTBFs have become increasingly important. Despite this 
importance, the literature does not give much guidance about the factors that determine 
the likelihood of acquisition or the acquisition return. The entrepreneurship literature 
has looked at cooperation-based commercialization strategies including acquisitions, 
but focuses predominantly on environmental factors influencing commercialization 
choice, neglecting to discuss the impact of managerial agency and differences in 
resource base. We try to fill this gap by exploring the drivers of the success of 
acquisitions from the perspective of the YTBF. We used the resource-based view to 
explain how managerial actions to build resources increase the likelihood of acquisition 
and its return, using a sample of 285 innovative, British ventures. Regarding acquisition 
likelihood, our results indicate that both hiring experienced top managers and patenting 
contributes to the likelihood of a firm realizing a trade sale. Partnerships on the other 
hand have no significant effect on acquisition likelihood. Possibly, because all companies 
in our sample are VC-backed, they already have gained sufficient visibility with potential 
acquirers. Additional partnerships do not help to signal quality to create visibility and 
enhance likelihood of being acquired. Regarding acquisition return, we predicted a 
positive impact of revenues and commercial partnerships on acquisition return. Both 
hypotheses were supported. In addition, we find that also research partners contribute 
to acquisition return. Although they do not signal the ability to generate revenues, they 
do contribute to acquisition return. Perhaps these research partnerships indicate a more 
focused, closer to market technology (Clarysse et al., 2011) reducing risk and 
uncertainty. Surprisingly, the impact of Hired Top Managers on acquisition return is 
negative. Possibly, the acquirers prefers to pay YTBFs with experienced top managers in 
the shape of earn-outs instead of high acquisition prices in order to retain those 
managers, resulting in a lower acquisition return.    
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3.6.1. Conceptual implications 
The conceptual implications of this paper are threefold. First, we contribute both 
empirically and conceptually to the literature on commercialization strategies. While 
previous research in this area predominantly focused on alliances as the most important 
mode of cooperative commercialization strategies, this study is one of the first to 
investigate the drivers of technology acquisitions as commercialization strategy. 
Moreover, by analyzing the strategic actions that contribute to acquisition success, we 
go beyond studies which have focused on commercialization strategy being shaped by 
environmental factors. Additionally, we distinguish between factors influencing 
acquisition likelihood and those influencing acquisition returns. Our results indicate that 
the resources and capabilities which contribute to acquisition likelihood are different 
from those contributing to acquisition returns. These results suggest that the resources 
needed to increase acquisition likelihood are the resources which allow the firm to 
develop to a certain level and reach a certain level of maturity. However, some of those 
resources might become redundant once the YTBF becomes part of a larger 
organization. As a result they have no effect on acquisition return. The growth process of 
YTBFs typically involves the following four stages: innovation assessment, offering 
development, commercialization and rapid growth, each of which requires different 
resources and capabilities (Partanen et al., 2008). In order to be considered as a 
potential acquisition target, the YTBF may need to reach at least the second stage 
(offering development) in order to be ‘investor ready’. Reaching the offering 
development stage implies that the YTBF has proof-of-concept and incorporates the 
development of an initial business model (Morris et al., 2005). At this point the technical 
uncertainty has decreased to a level which attracts the interest of the acquirer, thereby 
contributing to acquisition likelihood. As a YTBF moves to the next stages of growth, 
namely commercialization and rapid growth, it develops its own marketing and 
distribution networks. Consequently, the YTBF becomes less dependent on the 
complementary assets of the acquirer, resulting in a higher bargaining power and higher 
acquisition returns. Hence, YTBFs with the capabilities to generate revenues and 
commercial partnerships have clearly reached the commercialization stage of growth, 
implying a higher bargaining power towards potential acquirers and acquisition return. 
Conceptually, this implies the existence of various types of technology acquisitions 
depending on the stage of development in the company life cycle. We expect that this is 
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driven by the strength of the appropriability regime, whereby companies lacking in 
patents to protect their technology should take their venture one step further along the 
company development cycle and prove commercial viability by establishing commercial 
partnerships and revenues. To test this, we conducted post hoc analyses (table 5) 
including the interaction effect between patents and commercial capabilities. These 
results confirm that companies lacking in patents to protect their innovations benefit 
even more from establishing commercial partnerships. For the interaction with 
revenues on the other hand, we find the opposite effect, however this is not significant.  
Table 5: Interaction between patents and revenue generating capabilities 
 
Second, our insights enrich studies of the impact of VCs on YTBFs, which largely either 
focuses solely on IPOs or studies VC performance at portfolio level (considering jointly 
the number of IPOs and trade sales). Conversely, our study emphasizes trade sales as 
exit route. This focus is justified given the increasing importance of trade sales as exit 
route (Ritter, Gao & Zhu, 2011). Finally, we provide insights into the delicate trade-off 
between resources that contribute to acquisition likelihood and those that contribute to 
acquisition return.   
 
  
Heckman two step
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
VC Trade Sale Success 1.794674 *** 0.631229 1.795 *** 0.631
Biotech dummy -2.416 4.288 -2.177 4.297
Physical Science dummy 0.226 3.863 0.704 3.846
ICT dummy -0.044 2.907 0.316 2.890
Age -0.730 *** 0.245 -0.740 *** 0.245
Number of Employees 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.003 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.003
Number of Financing Rounds -0.162 *** 0.060 -1.046 1.172 -0.162 *** 0.060 -1.300 1.164
VC Amount 0.010 0.007 -0.020 0.071 0.010 0.007 -0.016 0.073
ASO dummy 0.513 0.315 -4.070 4.362 0.513 0.315 -1.871 4.411
Revenues 0.070 ** 0.034 0.067 ** 0.035
Number of Commercial Partners -0.015 0.012 1.266 *** 0.167 -0.015 0.012 1.160 *** 0.161
Number of Research Partners 0.085 0.118 4.263 *** 1.598 0.085 0.118 4.640 *** 1.640
Number of Syndicate Partners -0.037 0.044 0.429 0.589 -0.037 0.044 0.605 0.606
Patent Dummy 0.288 ** 0.146 2.971 4.085 0.288 ** 0.146 -6.014 4.620
Hired Top Managers 0.142 ** 0.066 -2.386 ** 0.946 0.142 ** 0.066 -2.321 ** 0.958
Patent Dummy x Revenues 0.000 0.000
Patent Dummy x Commercial Partners -0.932 * 0.512
Constant 0.006 0.196 7.513 5.897 0.006 0.196 4.937 5.904
Mills Lambda -0.048 3.76634
Observations 285 285
Censored observations 123 123
Uncensored observations 162 162
Wald Chi2 98.35 94.46
Model 1 Model 2
Selection Regression Selection Regression
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3.6.2. Policy and practice implications 
Besides these theoretical implications, this study also serves the interest of 
policymakers and practitioners. First, our results provide valuable insight for VCs as it 
helps them to advise portfolio companies to focus their resource building activities on 
those resources which are most likely to contribute to trade sale success. Similarly, 
YTBFs seeking to optimize their chances of a successful trade sale benefit from these 
insights. Our findings indicate that both patents and experienced top managers 
contribute to acquisition likelihood. However, YTBFs should take into account that  
these experienced top managers might become redundant once part of a larger 
organization. Our results reveal that depending on the strength of patent protection, 
different strategic actions are needed to increase acquisition return. Both revenues and 
commercial partnerships are important predictors of acquisition return, however 
commercial partnerships become even more important when YTBF cannot protect their 
technology with patents.  
 
3.6.3. Limitations 
As any study, ours has limitations. First, we were not able to collect data on 
environmental factors such as the appropriability regime of the technology nor on the 
way complementary assets are distributed in the markets which these companies target. 
This is an area for future research and controlling for these environmental contingencies 
might explain the contradictory results for the drivers of acquisition likelihood and 
acquisition price. Second, although we incorporate a longitudinal aspect in that we 
identify whether firms have exited, this study does  not involve a panel dataset. Panel 
data would allow time lags between developing resources and capabilities and realizing 
a trade sale to be taken into account. Third, additional research is needed to unravel the 
impact of partnerships. Considering both the nature of the partner and the nature of the 
partnership could provide some more detailed insights. Fourth, the measures we use to 
capture human resources and VC experience are approximations. Taking into account 
the nature of the expertise of both parties could yield more fine-grained results. Finally, 
our study does not consider the differences that might exist between various industries. 
The biotech industry for example, has a very clear path to commercialization, while 
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capturing value from software is less straight-forward. We conducted preliminary post-
hoc analyses that revealed that for each sector, experience of the lead VC with trade 
sales remains a stable predictor of acquisition return. In addition, we explored whether 
biotech firms and companies with a technology based on physical sciences differ from 
ICT companies. For the first group, patents are still positive and significant, while hiring 
experienced top managers has no significant effect. For companies in the ICT sector the 
contrary is true. Experienced top managers have a positive effect on acquisition 
likelihood, while patents become insignificant. Furthermore, the amount of revenues 
seems to contribute to the acquisition likelihood, while both commercial and research 
partners have a positive effect on acquisition return. These results seem to suggest that 
for companies in the biotech sector and in physical science the market for technology is 
a viable option as patents are the most important predictor of being acquired. In the ICT 
sector on the other hand, companies selling technology is sell straight-forward. 
Generating revenues and proving market acceptance by engaging in commercial 
partnerships seem to be more important in the pursuit of a successful trade sale. 
However, some caution is required when interpreting these results as the sample size 
for each sector is small. Further research is thus needed to explore the antecedents of a 
successful trade sale in each sector/industry.  
 
3.6.4. Conclusion 
Technology acquisitions have become increasingly important for YTBFs, both as a 
commercialization strategy providing access to the complementary assets necessary to 
bring their products to the market and as an exit route. However, received literature 
provides little guidance regarding the strategic actions which contribute to the 
realization of such a commercialization strategy. Our study is one of the first to analyze 
the strategic actions driving acquisition likelihood and return. Our results show that 
acquisition likelihood is affected by  the number of experienced top managers and the 
patent stock a YTBF has, while acquisition return is influenced by revenues, number of 
commercial, research and syndicate partners and patent stock.  
 100 
 
3.7. References 
Aggarwal, V.A., Hsu, D.H. 2009. Modes of Cooperative R&D Commercialization by 
Start-ups. Strategic Management Journal, 30(8): 835-864.  
Alvarez, S.A., Barney J.B. 2001. How entrepreneurial firms can benefit from 
alliances with large partners. Academy of Management Executive, 15(1): 139-148. 
Arora, A., Ceccagnoli, M. 2006. Patent protection, complementary assets, and 
firms' incentives for technology licensing. Management Science, 52(2): 293-308. 
Arora, A., Fosfuri, A., Gambardella, A. 2001. Markets for technology and their 
implications for corporate strategy. Industrial and Corporate Change, 10(2): 419-451. 
Arora, A., Fosfuri A., Gambardella, A. 2002. Markets for technology in the 
knowledge economy. International Social Science Journal, 54(1): 115.   
Barney, J.B. 1991. Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage. Journal 
of Management, 17(1): 99-120. 
Barney, J.B., Ketchen D.J., Wright, M. 2011. The Future of Resource-Based Theory: 
Revitalization or Decline? Journal of Management, 37(5): 1299-1315. 
Baum, A.C. & Silverman, B.S. 2004. Picking winners or building them? Alliance, 
intellectual, and human capital as selection criteria in venture financing and 
performance of biotechnology startups. Journal of Business Venturing, 19(3): 411-436 
Cassiman, B., Colombo, M., Garrone, P., & Veugelers, R. 2005. The Impact of M&As 
on the R&D process: an empirical analysis of the role of technological and market 
relatedness, Research Policy, 34(2): 195-220 
Chakrabarti, A., Haunschildt, J., & Sueverkruep, C. 1994. Does it pay to acquire 
technological firms? R&D Management, 24: 47-56. 
Chandler, G.N. & Hanks, S.H. 1994. Market attractiveness, resource-based 
capabilities, venture strategies and venture performance. Journal of Business 
Venturing, 9(4): 331-349    
Chiesa V. & Piccaluga, A. 2000. Exploitation and diffusion of public research: the 
case of academic spin-off companies in Italy. R&D Management, 30(4): 329-339.  
Clarysse, B.,  Bruneel, J.,  & Wright, M. 2009. Entrepreneurial Strategies of Growth-
Oriented YTBFs. Working paper  
Clarysse, B., Wright, M.,  & Van de Velde, E . 2011. Entrepreneurial Origin, 
Technological Knowledge, and the Growth of Spin-Off Companies. Journal of 
Management Studies, 48(6): 1420-1442. 
 101 
 
Cochrane, J. H. 2005. The risk and return of venture capital. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 75: 3-52. 
Cohen, W.M. & Levinthal, D.A. 1990. Absorptive capacity – a new perspective on 
learning and innovation. Administrative Science Quarterly, 35(1): 128-152. 
Colombo, M.G., Grilli, L. 2005. Founders’ human capital and the growth of new 
technology-based firms: a competence-based view. Research Policy, 34: 795-816.  
Colombo, M.G. & Piva, E. 2008. Strengths and weaknesses of academic startups: A 
conceptual model. IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management, 55(1): 37-49. 
Colombo, M.G. Grilli, L. & Murtinu, S. 2009. Effects of international R&D alliances 
on performance of high-tech start-ups: a longitudinal analysis. Strategic 
Entrepreneurship Journal: 3(4): 346-368. 
Cooper, A.C., GimenoGascon, F.J., Woo, C.Y. 1994. Initial human and financial 
capital as predictors of new venture performance. Journal of Business Venturing, 9(5): 
371-393.  
Cumming, D.J., & MacIntosh, J.G., 2003. A cross-country comparison of full and 
partial venture capital exits. Journal of Banking & Finance, 27(3): 511-548. 
Durand, R., Bruyaka, O., & Mangematin, V. 2008. Do science and money go 
together? The case of the French biotech industry. Strategic Management Journal, 
29(12): 1281-1299. 
Eisenhardt, K.M., & Schoonhoven, C.B. 1996.Resource-based view of strategic 
alliance formation: Strategic and social effects in entrepreneurial firms. Organization 
Science, 7(2): 136-150.    
Eisenhardt, K.M. & Martin, J.F. 2000. Dynamic capabilities: what are they? 
Strategic Management Journal, 21(10-11): 1105-1121. 
Ensley, M.D., & Hmieleski, K.A. 2005. A comparative study of new venture top 
management team composition, dynamics and performance between university-based 
and independent start-ups. Research Policy, 34(7): 1091-1105    
Fosfuri, A. 2006. The licensing dilemma: Understanding the determinants of the 
rate of technology licensing. Strategic Management Journal, 27(12): 1141-1158. 
Gabbay, S.M., & Leenders, R.T.A., 1999. The structure of advantage and 
disadvantage in Corporate Social Capital and Liability in Leenders, R.T.A., & Gabbay, S.M., 
Kluwer, New York, blz. 1-16. 
Gambardella, A., Giuri, P., & Luzzi, A. 2007. The market for patents in Europe. 
Research Policy, 36(8): 1163-1183.  
 102 
 
Gans, J.S., & Stern, S. 2003. The product market and the market for "ideas": 
commercialization strategies for technology entrepreneurs. Research Policy, 32(2): 
333-350 
Gans, J.S., Hsu, D.H., Stern, S. 2002. When does start-up innovation spur the gale of 
creative destruction? Rand Journal of Economics, 33(4): 571-586. 
Gompers, P.A. 1996. Grandstanding in the venture capital industry. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 42(1): 133-156 
Haeussler, C., Harhoff, D., Mueller, E. 2009. To be financed or not… - The role of 
patents for venture capital financing. Working paper, CEPR No. 7115. 
Heeley M.B., Matusik S.F., Jain N., 2007. Innovation, appropriability, and the 
underpricing of initial public offerings. Academy of Management Journal, 50(1): 209-
225.  
Heirman, A.0 & Clarysse, B. 2007. Which tangible and intangible assets matter for 
innovation speed in start-ups? Journal of Product Innovation Management, 24(4): 
303-315.    
Helfat, C.E., & Peteraf, M.A. 2003. The dynamic resource-based view: Capability 
lifecycles. Strategic Management Journal, 24(10): 997-1010 
Hellmann, T., & Puri, M. 2000. The interaction between product market and 
financing strategy: The role of venture capital. Review of Financial Studies, 13(4): 959-
984. 
Hellmann, T., Puri, M., 2002. Venture capital and the professionalization of start-
up firms: empirical evidence. Journal of Finance, 57: 169–197. 
Hitt, M., Hoskisson, R., Ireland, R.D., & Harrison, J. 1991. Effects of acquisitions on 
R&D inputs and outputs. Academy of Management Journal, 34: 693-706. 
Hoopes, D.G. , Madsen, T.L., & Walker, G. 2003.Guest editors' introduction to the 
special issue: Why is there a resource-based view? - Toward a theory of competitive 
heterogeneity. Strategic Management Journal, 24(10): 889-902. 
Hoskisson, R.E., Hitt,  M.A., Wan, W.P.,  Yiu, 1999. Theory and research in strategic 
management: Swings of a pendulum. Journal of Management, 25(3): 417-456. 
Kasch, S., & Dowling, M. 2008. Commercialization strategies of young 
biotechnology firms: An empirical analysis of the US industry. Research Policy, 37(10): 
1765-1777. 
Lee, C., Lee, K., & Pennings, J.M., 2001. Internal capabilities, external networks, 
and performance: A study on technology-based ventures. Strategic Management Journal, 
22(6-7):  615-640.    
 103 
 
Lemley, M.A., 2001. Rational ignorance at the Patent Office. Northwestern 
University Law Review, 95(4): 1495-1532. 
Lockett, A., & Wright, M., 2003. Technology transfer and universities' spin-out 
strategies. Small Business Economics, 20(2): 185-200.  
Lockett, A, Siegel, D, Wright, M., 2005 The creation of spin-off firms at public 
research institutions: Managerial and policy implications. Research Policy, 34(7): 981-
993. 
Megginson W.L., & Weiss K.A., 1991. Venture Capitalist Certification in Initial 
Public Offerings. Journal of Finance, 46(3): 879-903. 
Morris, M, Schindehutte, M, Allen. J. 2005. The entrepreneur's business model: 
toward a unified perspective. Journal of Business Research, 58(6): 726-735. 
Nahata, R., 2008. Venture capital reputation and investment performance. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 90(2): 127-151.  
Partanen, J., Moller, K., Westerlund, M., 2008. Social capital in the growth of 
science-and-technology-based SMEs. Industrial Marketing Management, 37(5): 513-
522. 
Pfeffer G.R., & Salancik J., 1978. Social Information-Processing Approach to Job 
Attitudes and Task Design. Administrative Science Quarterly, 23(2): 224-253.   
Pisano, G.P. 1991. The governance of innovation – vertical integration and 
collaborative arrangement in the biotechnology industry. Research Policy, 20(3): 237-
249.  
Puranam, P., Singh, H., Zollo, M., 2006. Organizing for innovation: Managing the 
coordination-autonomy dilemma in technology acquisitions. Academy of Management 
Journal, 49(2): 263-280. 
Ritter, J.R., Gao, X. & Zhu, Z. 2011. Where have all the IPOs gone? Available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1954788 
Rothaermel, F.D., & Deeds, D.L., 2004. Exploration and exploitation alliances in 
biotechnology: a system of new product development. Strategic Management Journal, 
25: 201-221. 
Shrader, R.C., & Simon, M. 1997. Corporate versus independent new ventures: 
Resource, strategy, and performance differences. Journal of Business Venturing, 
12(1): 47-66. 
Stuart, R.W., Abetti, P.A. 1990. Impact of entrepreneurial and management 
experience on early performance. Journal of Business Venturing, 5: 151-162.  
 104 
 
Teece, D.J. 1986. Profiting from technological innovation: implications for 
integration. collaboration and research policy. Research Policy, 15: 285-305. 
Vanaelst, I., Clarysse, B., Wright, M., S’Jegers, R., 2006. Entrepreneurial team 
development in academic spinouts: An examination of team heterogeneity. 
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 30(2): 249-271.  
Vanhaverbeke, W., Duysters, G., & Noorderhaven. N. 2002. External technology 
sourcing through alliances or acquisitions: an analysis of the applications-specific 
integrated circuits industry. Organization Science, 13(6): 714-733.  
Welbourne, T.M., & Andrews, A.O. 1996. Predicting the performance of initial 
public offerings: Should human resource management be in the equation? Academy of 
Management Journal, 39(4): 891-919 
Wernerfelt, B. 1984. A resource-based view of the firm. Strategic Management 
Journal, 5(2):171-180.  
 105 
 
4. Learning from Own and Others’ Previous Experience: 
The Contribution of the Venture Capital Firm to the 
Likelihood of a Portfolio Company’s Trade Sale 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
The objective of this paper is to examine to what extent different venture capital 
firms contribute to the likelihood that the portfolio company in which they 
invested will realize a trade sale. We use arguments from learning theory to 
hypothesize the relation between vicarious, experiential and congenital learning 
of the venture capital (VC) firm and the trade sale hazard of its portfolio 
companies. Based on our analysis of 206 VC-backed UK start-ups, we find that 
both trade sale experience of the VC and learning from syndicate partners with 
trade sale experience significantly increase the trade sale hazard. The routines 
and procedures learned from experienced syndicate partners complement 
experience accumulated through trial and error. Congenital trade sale 
experience of the investment managers on the contrary has no significant 
influence on the acquisition hazard. 
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4.1. Introduction 
Trade sales have been recognized as the most likely exit route for venture capital 
(VC) backed start-ups (Cumming and MacIntosh, 2003). An exit by trade sale or 
acquisition happens if the entire firm is sold to a third party, often a strategic 
acquirer (Cumming and MacIntosh, 2003).  Despite the fact that trade sales are 
such an important exit route, there is little theory about the factors influencing 
trade sale likelihood. The entrepreneurship literature has identified a number of 
contextual level factors which have a positive impact on the likelihood of a trade 
sale. Gans et al. (2002) highlight the environment in which companies start up, 
and more specifically the appropriability regime, as an important element of a 
likely trade sale. Start-ups in tight appropriability regimes can protect their 
technology more easily and hence are more likely to realize a trade sale. Others 
have focused on the strategic choices made by the VC-backed company to explain 
potential trade sale success. Porrini (2004) shows that cooperation with 
potential acquirers increases the likelihood of a trade sale for the VC-backed 
firm. The main reason why previous alliances increase trade sale likelihood is 
that they reduce information asymmetry between acquirer and target (Porrini, 
2004; Reuer and Ragozzino, 2008).  
 
One important actor for trade sale success, which - so far - has been 
understudied is the venture capitalist (VC). This is in contrast to the amount of 
studies of IPOs as an exit. Furthermore, within the private equity literature, there 
is extant literature suggesting that VCs monitor and add value to the companies 
in which they invest (Sapienza et al., 1996; Knockaert et al., 2006).  In other 
words, they are assumed to add value beyond the money they provide. Various 
studies have tried to link the value adding activities VC firms bring to portfolio 
companies. Sapienza (1992) and Sapienza and Timmons (1989) for instance 
detected positive correlations between VCs’ management support intensities and 
portfolio company performance. Schefczyk (2001) found that VCs who take an 
active role in their portfolio companies significantly increase the success rate of 
these companies. These studies have typically looked at revenues (Schefczyk, 
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2001), growth in revenues and/or employment (Bottazzi and Da Rin, 2002; 
Davila et al., 2003) or a combination of financial and technical performance 
shortly after investment decisions (Baum and Silverman, 2004). However, 
despite the importance of trade sales as potential indicators for success of VC-
backed companies, the possible contribution of particular VC firms to the 
likelihood of a trade sale of their portfolio firm is an area which so far has been 
largely neglected in the received literature.  
 
To fill this gap, this paper uses learning theory to evaluate the role played by the 
VC firm and its investment managers in their portfolio companies. Increasingly, 
researchers have argued that learning from previous own experiences or 
vicarious learning from others’ experiences is an important way to acquire 
knowledge (Kim and Miner, 2007). We would therefore expect that the 
experience a VC firm has with previous trade sales will have a positive impact on 
the likelihood of a subsequent trade sale of its portfolio companies. The learning 
literature distinguishes between three types of learning. Experiential learning 
includes the knowledge which is acquired from own past successes or failures 
(Ingram and Baum, 1997). Vicarious learning is defined as learning from the 
trade sale experience of other VC firms (Kim and Miner, 2007). Finally, 
congenital learning or congenital experience refers to the experience which has 
already accrued in the industry before the particular VC firm is founded (Meyer 
and Rowan, 1977). This kind of experience or learning is induced into the VC 
firm by recruiting for instance experienced investment managers.  
 
This research is based on the analysis of a sample of 206 VC backed UK start-ups. 
In addition, we conducted a qualitative investigation in which we interviewed 
eight VCs4 with diverse levels of experience in liquidation events. In presenting 
our hypotheses, the quotes and insights obtained from these interviews are used 
to illustrate and clarify the learning processes taking place in the VC firm. They 
                                                          
4
 We interviewed one investment managers from each of the following VC firms: Imperial 
Innovations, Index Ventures, Amadeus Capital, Debaeque Venture Capital, Alta Partners, Allegis 
Capital, VentureScout and Aster Capital 
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are not meant to generate strong empirical findings to build theory upon, but 
rather to illustrate that the theory we used to develop our hypotheses accurately 
reflects our empirical findings.  
 
This paper starts with a literature review in which we review the extant 
literature on the value-adding role of VCs. In addition to the value-adding role of 
VCs, we also briefly discuss the entrepreneurship literature on trade sales. In the 
following section, we outline in more detail the role played by the VC firm in 
increasing the likelihood of a trade sale. We suggest that the previous experience 
embedded in the VC firms, the experience of the investment managers setting up 
and/or joining the firm and the experience gained through the syndicate 
partners will play a significant role in determining the trade sale likelihood of the 
portfolio companies. Subsequently, we measure the effects of the different 
learning and experience variables, controlling for certain portfolio company and 
VC firm level characteristics. We conclude with a discussion of our findings and 
suggestions for future research.  
 
4.2. Literature Review 
Researchers have devoted much attention to the influences of VCs on the 
formation of start-ups (Barry et al., 1990) and further on the multiple ways in 
which VCs might enhance a start-up’s performance (Baum and Silverman, 2004).  
In a recent literature review on the value added of VCs to their portfolio 
companies, Large and Muegge (2008) conclude that the different value-adding 
inputs of VCs can be classified as internally or externally oriented. Externally 
oriented roles are usually linked to the image or legitimacy, and to some extent 
to the credibility, of the portfolio company towards external stakeholders (Fried 
and Hisrich, 1995). Internal contributions in the portfolio companies include 
recruitment (Murray, 1996), controlling (Ehrlich et al., 1994), strategic 
consulting (Timmons and Bygrave, 1986) and entrepreneurial mentorship 
(Busenitz et al., 2004). Although informative, this type of research remains 
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mainly atheoretical, leaving the question why VCs can better play this role than 
entrepreneurs unanswered.  
 
A second stream has adopted a more theoretical approach to why and how VCs 
add value to their portfolio companies beyond the capital invested. For instance, 
Dimov and Shepherd (2005) have taken a human capital perspective to explain 
the potential value added by VCs and demonstrate that general human capital 
contributes to the portion of IPOs realized by the VC firm. Knockaert et al. (2006) 
further extend the human capital perspective by arguing that VC investment 
managers who have previous entrepreneurial experience will be more engaged 
in value-adding activities than investment managers who lack that experience. 
Baum and Silverman (2004) not only include human capital as a potential 
determinant, but also highlight the importance of other forms of capital such as 
intellectual and social capital in explaining the coaching role of VCs in their 
portfolio companies. In summary, this literature has mainly used a resource-
based perspective to explain differences in the behavior of VCs.  
 
In parallel, a stream of VC literature with roots in the finance literature has 
looked at the performance of VCs at the portfolio company level, mainly focusing 
on IPOs of the portfolio companies. In this literature stream, measures of VC firm 
experience such as age, accumulative aggregate investment and number of 
investment rounds have been analyzed for their impact on IPO success or 
aggregate portfolio performance (Lerner, 1994; Gompers, 1996). More recently, 
indirect experience variables such as the network position of the VC firm 
(Hochberg et al., 2007), connectedness of the VC firm (Sorensen, 2007) or a 
composite measure of both experience and connectedness (Nahata, 2008) were 
added to explain the performance of VCs and their portfolio companies in terms 
of IPOs. In this empirically driven literature stream, there seems to be a clear 
consensus that the experience of the VC firm and its position within the 
networked community of VCs have a positive impact on the performance of the 
VC, measured by the IPO success of its portfolio companies. 
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Despite the fact that many papers have investigated the contribution of the 
value-adding role of the VC to performance at VC firm level or portfolio company 
level, the impact of these value-adding inputs on outcomes has been inconclusive 
so far (Large and Muegge, 2008).  Much of this confusion has been attributed to 
the lack of consensus for measuring the outcome of those value-adding roles. 
Some studies have investigated performance at portfolio company level and 
studied the impact on outcomes such as company growth (e.g., Davila et al., 
2003; Bottazzi and Da Rin, 2002) or time to exit (Giot and Schwienbacher, 2007), 
while other studies have considered performance at the VC firm level (e.g., 
Dimov and Shepherd, 2005; Jaaskelainen et al., 2006). Usually, investors and VCs 
earn their returns when the venture in which they invested is sold to another 
organization or when the shares of the company become publicly traded (IPO). 
Therefore, Large and Muegge (2008) conclude that future studies should place a 
greater emphasis on measuring directly observable events in companies’ life 
cycle, such as realizing an exit. 
 
Cumming and MacIntosh (2003) argue that the trade sale of a portfolio company 
is the most common exit route for a VC-backed company, followed by secondary 
exits or IPOs. Even though IPOs tend to lead to higher returns, the majority of the 
returns realized by VCs are still derived from trade sales (Gompers, 1996). 
Figure 1 provides an overview of the number of IPOs and trade sales realized 
each year in the period 2000 to 2008, comparing Europe with the UK. These 
numbers verify that trade sales are indeed a more likely exit route than IPOs. 
Only in the dotcom bubble of 2000 was the number of IPOs higher than the 
amount of trade sales. In all other years, IPOs are only a fraction of trade sales, 
both in numbers and value. A similar trend can be noted when considering the 
deal value of those two exit types of exit routes. Figure 8 displays the total 
amount of money raised for each type of exit.  Again the total amount of money 
raised with trade sales is consistently larger than for IPOs, with exception of the 
dotcom year 2000. Hence, the portfolio’s ability to realize a trade sale is equally 
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important for a VC firms’ exit success as the ability to realize IPOs. Surprisingly, 
trade sales have not been analyzed as an indicator of portfolio company success 
in the venture capital literature.  
Figure 8: Annual evolution of trade sales and IPOs in Europe and the UK: number 
of companies5 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Annual evolution of trade sales and IPOs in Europe and the UK: Total 
amount of money raised (million $) 
 
 
 
                                                          
5
 Figures obtained from VentureSource (www.venturesource.com) 
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Even in the entrepreneurship literature, the evidence on which factors 
determine the potential for a trade sale is very weak. Gans et al. (2002) 
considered trade sales as a form of cooperation between start-ups and 
incumbents and concluded that the strength of the appropriability regime 
increased the chances of realizing a trade sale. Start-ups operating in 
environments where the technology is easy to protect have a higher chance of a 
trade sale than start-ups operating in weak appropriability environments. Other 
studies such as Porrini (2004) have specifically focused on the managerial 
decisions which a start-up can take to increase the likelihood of realizing a trade 
sale. Porrini (2004) shows that collaborating with potential acquirers increases 
the likelihood of the start-up to be acquired by one of those collaborating 
partners. Cooperation in a pre-acquisition stage is supposed to decrease the 
information asymmetry between a start-up or young firm and its potential 
acquirer and hence increases the likelihood of acquisition.  
 
As trade sale success is such an important variable for both the start-up and the 
VC firm investing in the company, a major research question which remains to be 
investigated is then to which extent a VC firm can contribute to the trade sale of a 
portfolio company. In this paper, we build on the results of the VC literature in 
finance, but add a theoretical perspective to explain why experience of VCs  
might have a positive effect on the likelihood of realizing a trade sale. The 
theoretical perspective used to explain this is learning theory.  
 
4.3. Hypothesis Development 
The learning literature distinguishes between three clear forms of learning (Kim 
and Miner, 2007): vicarious, experiential and congenital learning. Vicarious 
learning refers to learning from other organizations’ experiences (Ingram and 
Baum, 1997). Experiential learning refers to the learning that takes place in a 
history-dependent, routine-based incremental way (March, 1991). Finally, the 
learning literature refers to congenital experience as experience that has already 
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accrued within an industry before a focal firm is founded (Meyer and Rowan, 
1977).  We will build upon these three different concepts adopted from the 
learning literature to elaborate our hypothetical framework. 
 
Experiential Learning. This notion of learning is rooted in the behavioral theory 
of the firm: an organization’s behavior and actions are viewed as based on past 
activities and previously developed routines (Cyert and March, 1963). VC firm 
level experience might still be considered the primary source of learning among 
VC firms with regard to trade sales. Trade sales are complex events, which tend 
to involve a high amount of tacit knowledge. This knowledge is argued to be 
cumulated through discovery, learning by doing and experience, each of which 
are indicators of experiential learning (Yang et al., 2009). 
 
Experiential learning thus assumes that VC firms learn from conducting activities 
repeatedly and adapting their routines to their past experiences. This kind of 
learning requires repetition, as VC firms need to evaluate the outcome responses 
to their actions. In other words, VC firms need to evaluate whether decisions 
which have led to previous trade sales were successful or not and which 
components can be translated into routines that might become a roadmap for 
future trade sales. Existing routines are then assumed to be the outcome of this 
trial and error process along with the selection and retention of routines and 
procedures developed in the past. 
 
Experiential learning implies that the more experience a particular VC firm has 
with trade sales, the more routines it will have developed to guide future trade 
sales. Interestingly, learning theory assumes that both positive and negative 
trade sales will generate a learning experience which provides value added in 
comparison with those VC firms that do not have any trade sale experience at all 
or very little trade sale experience.  
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Our qualitative investigation supports the value of experiential learning as a 
process, taking place at the level of the VC firm. Four of the eight VCs we 
interviewed mentioned explicitly that they share their liquidation experiences 
among the different investment managers of the VC firm, which indicates that 
experiential learning takes place at the firm level. In two cases, this knowledge 
has been used for developing standard processes to better steer the exits, 
including internal reporting and standard six-monthly evaluation of later stage 
companies in the portfolio. In 2 other cases this common knowledge about 
liquidation experiences has been transformed into rules such as always syndicate 
investments, work only with certain investment and operational partners, and 
invest in serial entrepreneurs.  
 
Therefore we argue: 
Hypothesis 1 : The more trade sale experience the lead VC firm has, the greater 
the likelihood that its portfolio company will end up in a trade sale. 
 
 
Vicarious Learning. Theories of organizational learning imply that successful 
experiences in the VC community (such as trade sales) are important sources of 
vicarious learning (Lant and Mezias, 1990). Such previous trade sales are 
composed of rich, complex information, which can be embedded in a series of 
accumulative events, which form the process leading to the closure of a 
successful trade sale (Kim and Miner, 2007). A large number of trade sales in the 
industry provide VCs with many opportunities to observe the underlying factors 
which have potentially led to the successful trade sale. In other words, the 
observed trade sales serve as a series of experiments and are an essential source 
of information. VC firms observe other firms’ trade sales to gain information to 
make new investments and to adjust the strategy of their portfolio companies. 
However, as much of the trade sale information tends to be complex information, 
traditional learning theory suggests that VC firms will experience difficulties to 
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learn from that information unless they have a direct access to the VC firms 
possessing this information (Cyert and March, 1963).  
 
VC firms do have a particular way of learning from each other, namely 
syndication. It has been shown in the VC literature that VC firms syndicate to 
have a chance to benchmark their own thinking against other knowledgeable 
sources (Wright and Lockett, 2003; De Clercq and Dimov, 2008). If two or three 
firms syndicate, they contrast each other’s opinions (Lerner, 1994). Moreover, 
they exchange templates of procedures and share best practices to optimize the 
decision-making within the syndicate. This kind of knowledge exchange is what 
is called vicarious learning in the learning literature. Along this line of reasoning, 
we would expect that a VC firm which is syndicated with other VC firms that 
have an in-depth experience in trade sales, will learn from their syndicating 
partners and transpose this knowledge towards their own portfolio companies.  
 
The interviewees provided qualitative evidence that syndication partners are an 
important source of knowledge, both for junior as well as for more senior 
investors. A senior investor stated: 
 
“After eight acquisitions and one IPO as investment 
manager, I am still learning from the syndicating 
partners. I learn management skills from older VCs, 
and I also learn to identify the best entrepreneurs, 
passionate, smart and flexible. This is probably the 
most difficult task for a VC.”   
 
Possibly but not necessarily, the vicarious learning takes place in the specific 
syndicate that has invested in the focal portfolio company. It can also be that the 
VC firm learns from colleague VCs that have syndicated with the VC firm in other 
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portfolio companies than the one which we have studied. So, we take into 
account that a specific VC will not be active in a particular syndicate where they 
are not the lead, but will have access to a broader network of VCs and other 
professionals, which represents the accumulation of syndicates and exit 
experiences in which the VC firm takes part. A VC shared an example with us: 
 
“We invested in a drug discovery start-up in syndication 
with three other experienced VCs. It was the syndicating 
investment manager at SV Life Sciences who helped the 
company recruit a chairman who recently completed a trade 
sale of a similar company.  Our business was subsequently 
sold to the same trade buyer and so I have no doubt that the 
experience and networks of the syndicate made a difference” 
 
Therefore we argue: 
Hypothesis 2: The more a lead VC firm is syndicated to other VC firms with 
experience in trade sales, the greater the likelihood that its portfolio 
firm will end up in a trade sale. 
 
Congenital Experience / Learning. Congenital experience refers to the experience 
that has already accrued within an industry before a focal firm is founded (Meyer 
and Rowan, 1977).  This type of experience results from the knowledge brought 
into the firm by recruiting experienced investment managers or - in case of a 
new VC firm -  by setting up the VC firm with general partners/investment 
managers with past experiences in the VC industry. If a new VC firm is created, it 
is unlikely that this new firm will have to build up its practices and rules from 
scratch. It is more likely that the general partners setting up the firm have 
personal experience from working with other VC firms. The availability of 
congenital experience when the VC firm is created is likely to influence its future 
learning outcomes as well (Huber, 1991). In other words, the experience of the 
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investment managers setting up and/or joining the firm is likely to determine 
the decisions that are taken afterwards and the way in which these decisions are 
taken.  
 
Congenital learning thus goes beyond vicarious learning from syndicate 
partners. It touches upon the experience accumulated at the individual level, 
regardless where this experience comes from. Our qualitative investigation 
provided evidence of the learning experience that was available at the moment 
the partners started the VC firm. As an example, the founder of the search engine 
Ask.com who, after his company was traded on the NASDAQ stock and retired 
upon the acquisition by InterActiveCorp at US$1.85 billion, started a VC firm. He 
said: 
 
“Selling a company is like a selling a car. Once you learn 
how to sell a car fast and for a high price, you just do it 
every time you want to sell another car.” 
 
The previous example shows how congenital learning is transferred from one job 
experience to a new VC firm. The general partners who set up a VC firm and the 
investment managers working for a VC firm probably have gone through trade 
sales while working for other VC firms, or may have taken their own companies 
through a trade sale as an entrepreneur. The stock of knowledge accumulated 
through these experiences is likely to determine their decision-making process 
and to change the way in which they prepare the portfolio companies for a trade 
sale. Three of the VCs mention that hiring plays an important role in accessing 
congenital experience. For example, one of the interviewees stated that his VC 
firm gained significant knowledge about exits by hiring the VP of a big 
multinational corporate venture. The partners at the VC firm learned how to 
build and prepare a company to be acquired by a big corporation. In some other 
cases, the interviewees have pointed to the benefits of hiring partners with 
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entrepreneurial experience and coming from experienced VC firms as they bring 
along very valuable knowledge to the firm.     
 
Therefore we argue:  
Hypothesis 3: The more trade sale experience the managers raising/joining a VC 
firm have, the greater the likelihood that its portfolio firm will end up 
in a trade sale. 
 
4.4. Method 
4.4.1. Sample 
To test our hypotheses, a unique hand-collected sample of 206 VC-backed 
companies was constructed. As a sample frame, we used the VentureSource 
database provided by Dow Jones. VentureSource offers a comprehensive 
database which tracks the key developments of more than 30.000 venture-
backed companies situated in the US, Europe, Israel and China. The ventures in 
our sample are all situated in the UK. Furthermore, the database offers detailed 
company reports which track the financing history in addition to information 
about target markets, products, milestones, financial performance, key 
customers, management team and board members. Besides these company 
profiles, VentureSource also provides access to investor profiles. These give a 
detailed overview of the fund raising activity, the general partners and/or 
investment managers managing the VC firm, and how the portfolio is diversified 
in terms of industry, geography and investment stage. This information allows us 
to analyze VC firms’ performance by measuring the number of companies that 
realized an IPO, were sold or went out of business. In other words, this 
information allowed us to calculate the success of each investor with respect to 
realizing trade sales. 
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We started the construction of our sample by searching in VentureSource for all 
acquired ventures situated in the UK. Subsequently, we used the matched pair 
methodology introduced by Megginson and Weiss (1991) to identify similar VC-
backed companies which haven’t been acquired. For each acquired firm in our 
sample, we identified a similar company that was not acquired. As matching 
criteria, we used the sector, founding year and nationality of the companies. To 
match the companies as closely as possible, we used the three-digit sector 
classification. If no companies matched that profile, sector classification was 
extended to match the two-digit classification. This resulted in a sample of 206 
VC-backed companies situated in the UK, of which 106 companies were acquired 
by 2009. The companies in the matched sample were still active in 2009. All 
companies in the sample were created between 1982 and 2006, and the acquired 
companies were acquired between 1997 and 2008.  Consequently our window of 
observations covers the period 1982 to 2009, implying all companies were 
tracked from year of founding until 2009.  
 
4.4.2. Survival Analysis 
Our statistical analysis relies on survival analysis. Survival analysis techniques 
are highly suitable to address our research hypotheses as we are interested in 
explaining the factors that contribute to the hazard of being acquired. 
Furthermore, the non-acquired firms in our sample were still active in the year 
2009 (i.e. the last year of our window of observation), implying that these firms 
are still at risk of being acquired. Together, these factors make survival analysis 
the most appropriate technique of analysis. More specifically, this paper uses the 
Cox proportional hazard model. The Cox proportional hazards regression model 
(1972) asserts that the hazard rate for the jth subject in the data is 
h(t|x1j, x2J, … , xkj ) = h0(t) exp(β1x1j + β2x2j + … βkxkj) 
 
The major advantage of the Cox model is that it avoids making potentially 
untenable distributional assumptions about the hazard rate. Although this model 
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does not make any assumptions about the baseline hazard, there is one 
important assumption which should be taken in account, namely the assumption 
of proportionality. This assumption implies that the survival curves for two 
strata must have hazard functions that are proportional over time (i.e. constant 
relative hazard). The validity of this assumption is often questionable as the 
impact of many covariates are clearly time dependent. This issue can be tackled 
by introducing time-dependent covariates in the model which represent the 
interaction of the original covariate with time (Allison, 1990).  
 
4.4.3. Dependent variable 
Given the use of survival analysis as method of analysis, our dependent variable 
is the hazard that a subject will be acquired in a given year.  As trade sales have 
been identified as the most likely exit route for VC-backed firms (Cumming and 
MacIntosh, 2003), the hazard of being acquired is a suitable dependent variable 
in our research design.   
 
4.4.4. Independent variables 
To capture the three forms of learning previously defined, we used the 
information provided by the investor profiles in VentureSource. We only 
considered the impact of the lead investor (Higgins and Gulati, 2006) in the latest 
round of financing, i.e. the financing round closest to exit, as we expect that the 
lead investor of the latest financing round will have the highest impact on the 
exit process. According to learning theory, which suggests that actors learn both 
from positive and negative experiences, we consider all trade sales rather than 
limiting the study to the successful ones. Some of the trade sales realized by a VC 
have a negative return (i.e. the acquisition price is lower than the amount of VC 
received), while other trade sales are highly successful as the acquisition price is 
a multiple of the amount of venture capital received. The first type of trade sales 
can be seen as failures, while the second type of trade sales are clearly successes. 
Several studies on the outcome of learning from success and failure have 
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confirmed that organizations learn both from failures and successes (e.g. Kim, 
Kim and Miner, 2009; Lant and Montgomery, 1987). 
 
Experiential learning (VC_experiential): Experiential learning or learning by 
doing refers to the knowledge base the VC firm has built over the years by 
performing similar activities repeatedly. Therefore, the amount of experiential 
learning is closely related to the number of trade sales the VC firm has realized in 
the past. To capture this, we counted the number of trade sales in the portfolio of 
the VC firm in a given year. Experiential learning is thus measured as the 
accumulated number of trade sales realized by the VC.  
 
Vicarious learning (VC_vicarious): In order to capture the extent of vicarious 
learning by each lead investor, we needed both information on the number of 
syndicate partners each VC firm has and the experience of these partners in 
trade sales. Using the information provided by VentureSource, we identified the 
VCs who the lead VC syndicated with and the experience of these partners with 
trade sales.  Vicarious learning was measured as the total number of trade sales 
of all syndication partners of the lead VC. 
 
Congenital learning (VC_congenital): To gauge congenital learning, we analyzed 
whether the general partners/investment managers who set up and/or joined 
the VC firm, already had previous trade sale experience before their appointment 
in the firm. The trade sale experience could either be as an entrepreneur who 
had sold his company or as an investment manager previously working for 
another VC firm. We used the information available from VentureSource to check 
whether each of the investment managers/general partners has been involved in 
trade sales before. A dummy variable was constructed, indicating whether the 
investment managers/general partners of the firm had trade sale experience or 
not. As soon as one of the general partners has previous experience with trade 
sales, this dummy takes value one. 
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Control Variables: We control for a number of variables, some of which relate to 
characteristics of the portfolio company itself, while others relate to the lead VC 
firm investing in the portfolio company. Regarding the VC firm, we control for VC 
age, for the fact whether the lead VC is a corporate VC or not and for the fact 
whether the lead VC was already involved in the first financing round or not. 
Controlling for VC age (VC_age) is important, as age may be an indicator for its 
experience. The older the VC firm, the more likely it will have built up experience 
in realizing trade sales (Dimov and Shepherd, 2005). In addition, we also control 
for whether the lead investor is a corporate VC (Corp_VC_dummy). This is 
important as many large companies use corporate VC as a window on future 
technologies and as a first step in acquiring promising technology-based 
ventures (Benson and Ziedonis, 2008). Finally, we use a dummy to control for 
the fact whether the lead investor already invested in the first financing round or 
not (VC_first_round_dummy). Doing so, we control for reverse causality since it 
might be possible that VC firms with a lot of experience in trade sales enter 
syndicates as lead investors in the last financing round, when the likelihood of a 
trade sale is already very high.   
 
At the level of the portfolio company, the following controls were included: 
patent stock, number of financing rounds, amount of VC financing received, 
number of syndicate VC partners and number of team members. First, we control 
for the accumulated number of patents (patent_stock) in possession of the 
portfolio companies in a given year. The work of Gans et al. (2002) indicates that 
strong appropriability regimes positively affect the likelihood of being acquired. 
Patents are typically used as indicators of the strength of the appropriability 
regime (eg. Gans et al., 2002). Second, number of team members at start-up is 
included as control measure (N_start_team). Previous research indicates that 
human capital is crucial for the success of young technology-based ventures (e.g. 
Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1990; Cooper, GimenoGascon, and Woo, 1994) and 
influences investor decisions (Higgins and Gulati, 2006). As a result, we expect 
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that it also contributes to the attractiveness of a young technology-based firm as 
an acquisition target. A study of Graebner (2004) confirms that much of the 
value of technology ventures depends on the human capital. If key personnel 
leaves after acquisition, the value of the human capital decreases. Finally, we 
included some controls relating to venture capital deals made by the portfolio 
company such as the total amount of VC financing received by the firm 
(VC_amount), the number of financing rounds (N_fin_rounds) and the number of 
syndicate partners (N_syndication), representing the number of VCs firms that 
invested in the portfolio company besides the lead investor, as all three variables 
are potential indicators of the quality of the venture and thus contribute to the 
likelihood of being acquired (Nahata, 2008). VCs constantly monitor the 
performance of the ventures in which they invest, continually evaluating the 
venture’s promise, need for additional capital, use of capital and whether to 
liquidate the investment or not. Consequently, VCs will only provide additional 
capital and follow-on funding when the company continues to do well (Gompers, 
1995). In addition, Brander, Amit and Antweiler (2002) provided evidence that 
syndicated VC deals obtain higher returns. As a result, one might expect that they 
also have a higher likelihood of being acquired. We control for this by taking in 
account the number of syndicate partners of the lead VC. 
 
Thus, in our model the hazard of being acquired is the following function:  
h(t|trade sale) = h0(t) exp((β1 + β2t)Patent_stock + (β3 + β4t)Number of Financing 
Rounds + β5Number of Syndicate Partners + (β6 + β7t)Amount of VC financing + 
β8Number of Team Members + (β9 + β10t)VC_age+ β11Corporate VC dummy + 
β12VC first round dummy + (β13 + β14t)VC_experiential + β15VC_vicarious + 
β16VC_congenital) 
For those variables that vary in time, a interaction term of the respective variable 
with time was included besides to original variable. 
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4.5. Analyses 
4.5.1. Descriptives 
Table 9 provides the descriptive statistics of our sample, including the mean and 
standard deviation. Table 10 compares the status of the acquired and non-
acquired firms in the year of acquisition.  
Table 6: Descriptives of complete sample 
 
 
Table 7: Comparison of acquired and non-acquired firms in year of 
acquisition 
 
 
There are a number of significant differences between the group of the non-
acquired companies and the acquired companies. Regarding the measures at 
portfolio company level, it seems that the two groups mainly differ in terms of 
the financing they receive. On average, the non-acquired companies went 
Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Trade Sale Equals 1 if company realized a trade sale in a given year 0.0496 0.2172 0 1 
VC_age Age of the lead VC investor in a given year 13.3174 15.8772 0 73 
VC_first_round_dummy 
Dummy indicating whether the lead VC already invested in the first 
round 
0.7231 0.4475 0 1 
Corp_VC_dummy Dummy indicating whether the lead VC is a corporate VC 0.0310 0.1734 0 1 
Patent_stock Acumulated number of patents in a given year 1.0175 7.8492 0 171 
N_fin_round Accumulated number of financing rounds in a given year 1.5034 1.4416 0 9 
VC_amount Accumated amount of VC received 6705985 14900000 0 160000000
N_syndication 
Number of syndication partners lead VC has invested with in that 
particalar firm 
2.4806 2.9414 0 14 
N_start_team Number of team members at start-up 5.0129 2.6489 1 19 
VC_experiential Accumulated number of trade sales the VC has realized in a given year 24.1011 57.9186 0 465 
VC_vicarious 
Accumulated number of Trade sales realized by the syndication 
partners of the VC 
285.3151 574.5636 0 2269 
VC_congenital 
Dummy indicating whether the general partners setting up de VC firm 
have experience with trade sales 
0.4140 0.4927 0 1 
 
  Non Acquired  Acquired Results T-
Test 
Results 
Wilcoxon 
Ranksum test   Median Mean St. Dev. Median Mean St. Dev. 
VC_age 9,5 17,73 17,75 16,00 20,29 17,87 / / 
VC_first_round_dummy 1 0,75 0,43 1,00 0,78 0,41 / / 
Corp_VC_dummy 0 0,04 0,19 0,00 0,06 0,24 / / 
Patent_stock 0 1,40 8,65 0,00 1,22 3,20 / / 
N_fin_round 3 3,09 1,95 2,00 2,59 1,54 ** * 
VC_amount 
                   
4.456.592    
                
10.100.000    
                
15.500.000    
                   
6.400.019    
                
12.000.000    
                
13.700.000    
/ ** 
N_syndication 1 2,24 2,93 1,00 2,24 2,80 / / 
N_start_team 5 4,93 3,01 5,00 4,88 2,35 / / 
VC_experiential 5,5 40,06 75,35 11,50 53,26 81,97 * ** 
VC_vicarious 142 461,97 706,43 173,50 634,48 818,36 ** * 
VC_congenital 0 0,28 0,45 0,00 0,44 0,50 *** ** 
***: p < 0.01         
**: p < 0.05         
*: p < 0.10         
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through 3.09 financing rounds, which is significantly more than the acquired 
firms who on average went through 2.59 financing rounds. In terms of amount 
received however, it looks as if the acquired firms have accumulated a larger 
amount of VC financing (about 12 million British pounds against 10.1 million for 
the non-acquired firms). A finding which is confirmed by the T-test, the medians 
however do not significantly differ. There seem to be no significant differences 
between the acquired and the non-acquired firms in term of intellectual capital, 
number of team members at start-up and number of syndicate partners.   
 
The two groups also demonstrate some differences regarding the lead VC. The 
lead investor investing in the acquired firms is on average 20.29 years old, while 
the lead investor of the non-acquired firms has an average age of 17.73. The 
differences are even bigger when looking at the medians. While these differences 
seem substantial, they are not significant as the p-values for the T-test and 
Wilcoxon ranksum test are below 10%. More important however are the 
differences regarding the various types of experience. For all three types, we find 
significant differences between the acquired and non-acquired firms. The lead 
VC of the acquired firms has realized on average 53 trade sales, while the lead VC 
of the non-acquired firms counts on average only 40 trade sales in his portfolio. 
Furthermore, we find that the lead VC of the acquired companies has an average 
of 634 trade sale in his syndication network, while the lead VC of the non-
acquired companies has a network which represents on average only 462 trade 
sales. Finally, with respect to the congenital experience of the VC firms, about 
44% of the lead VCs had previous congenital experiences with trade sales.  This 
is substantially more that the lead VCs of the non-acquired firms, where only 
28% of the VC firms had congenital experience with trade sales.  
 
4.5.2.Main Model 
To determine whether the above differences play a role in estimating the 
probability of exit by trade sale, we performed a Cox proportional hazard 
regression. Model 1 summarizes the results for the base model, only including 
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the control variables. None of the control variables seems to have a significant 
impact on the hazard of being acquired. In the next three models the impact of 
each type of learning is entered separately, while in the last model all three 
modes of learning are entered simultaneously.  
In model 2 of table 3, the first explanatory variable, experiential learning of the 
VC is introduced in the model. In comparison with model 1, the patent stock has 
now a positive impact on the hazard of being acquired, although this influence is 
only marginally significantly, with a p-value lower than 0.10. More importantly 
however is the influence of experiential learning on the hazard of being acquired. 
While the coefficient in the main model is positive and significant, the coefficient 
in the time-varying covariates equation is negative and significant. Together, 
these results imply that experiential learning has a significant positive impact on 
the acquisition hazard, which decreases over time. These findings are confirmed 
in model 5 where all explanatory variables are included. Experiential learning 
continues to have a significantly positive but decreasing impact as the p-value 
even drops below 0.01. We thus find manifest support for the first hypothesis.  
 
In model 3 of table 3, the impact of vicarious learning (i.e. learning through trade 
sale experience of other VCs) is tested. In this model, the only variable with a 
significant impact is the explanatory variable vicarious learning. The p-value is 
below 0.01 implying support for hypothesis 2. Again, the significant impact of 
vicarious learning is also confirmed by the full model (p < 0.05).  
 
Finally, in model 4, the third explanatory variable, congenital experience, is 
introduced. According to this model, there is no support to accept hypothesis 3. 
The full model confirms this. Thus, hypothesis 3, which states that congenital 
experience has a positive impact on the hazard of being acquired, cannot be 
accepted.  
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Table 8: Results of cox regression 
 
 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 
  Base Model H1 H2 H3 Full Model 
Main      
VC_age -0.6341 -0.6542 -0.7747 -1.4417 -3.3705 
 (0.5758) (0.5006) (0.5847) (0.0971) (2.2278) 
VC_first_round_dummy 0.1883 0.1394 0.0534 0.1847 0.0562 
 (0.2418) (0.2437) (0.2490) (0.2488) (0.2539) 
Corp_VC_dummy -0.3221 -0.1938 -0.2095 -0.2858 -0.1516 
 (0.5386) (0.5657) (0.5332) (0.5102) (0.5242) 
Patent_stock 39.56 55.63 * 41.1943 36.5693 57.3015 * 
 (32.46) (31.11) (33.1577) (32.6540) (34.5827) 
N_fin_round 43.38 43.45 28.9631 45.669 27.5455 
 (100.48) (101.81) (99.4842) (101.0767) (101.3849) 
VC_amount 6.33E-06 -3.43E-06 6.52E-06 8.42E-06 -1.14E-06 
 6.57E-06 (7.83E-06) 7.26E-06 (6.99E-06) (8.73E-06) 
N_syndication -0.0628 -0.0636 -0.0815 -0.0497 -0.0636 
 (0.0522) (0.0503) (0.0562) (0.0531) (0.0569) 
N_start_team -0.0021 -0.0071 -0.0081 -0.0051 -0.0112 
 (0.0348) (0.0347) (0.0355) (0.0343) (0.0353) 
VC_experiential  3.1585 **   4.0716 *** 
  (1.2743)   (1.4033) 
VC_vicarious   0.0004 ***  0.0004 ** 
   (0.0001)  (0.0002) 
VC_congenital    0.2041 0.1662 
    (0.2137) (0.2203) 
tvc           
VC_age 0.0003 0.0003 0.0004 0.0007 0.0017 
 (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0011) 
Patent_stock -0.0197 -0.0277 * -0.0205 -0.0182 -0.0285 * 
 (0.0161) (0.01555) (0.0165) (0.0163) (0.0172) 
N_fin_round -0.0216 -0.0217 -0.0144 -0.0228 -0.0137 
 (0.0501) (0.0508) (0.0496) (0.0504) (0.0505) 
VC_amount -3.15E-09 1.72E-09 -3.24E-09 -4.19E-09 5.77E-10 
 (3.28e-09) (3.90E-09) (3.62E-09) (3.48E-09) (4.35E-09) 
VC_experiential  -0.0016 **   -0.002 *** 
  -0.0006   (0.0007) 
N observations 2112 2112 2112 2112 2112 
N subjects 206 206 206 206 206 
N failures (i.e. trade sales) 105 105 105 105 105 
Log Likelihood -522.99 519.50 -519.08 -521.78 -515.28 
Notes: variables in tvc equation interacted with _t    
***: p < 0.01      
**: p < 0.05      
*: p < 0.10      
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4.6. Discussion 
In this paper, we have evaluated the extent to which VCs contribute to the 
potential trade sale of their portfolio companies. More specifically, we have 
taken a learning perspective, to examine alternative explanations for the 
behavior of different VC firms.  
 
The results of our analysis show that among the three types of learning,  
experiential and vicarious  learning of the VC firm significantly contribute to the 
likelihood of a trade sale of its portfolio companies, but congenital learning has 
no significant impact. These findings seem to suggest that VC firms build up their 
own routines over time through a process of trial and error, while the knowledge  
investment managers had before joining the venture capital firm – congenital 
knowledge – becomes irrelevant. Even if the investment managers of the VC firm 
have trade sale experience before founding the firm, these routines and 
procedures developed before the start-up of the VC firm tend to change over 
time as the firm develops its own insights through learning by doing. Therefore, 
one might expect that the impact of congenital experience fades away over time, 
potentially explaining why congenital experience makes no significant 
contribution to the hazard of being acquired. Regarding vicarious learning, the 
results are in line with previous findings in the VC literature which tend to 
emphasize the importance of syndicate partners as sources of knowledge. 
Syndicate partners are often seen as valuable sources of information which can 
complement the lack of experience of the lead investors in one or more domains. 
However, when comparing the coefficients of both forms of learning, it is clear 
that experiential learning contributes more to the hazard of being acquired than 
vicarious learning. We can explain this through the fact that certain types of 
knowledge such as tacit knowledge are difficult to transfer and can only be 
learned through learning by doing (Hansen, 1999).  However, an alternative 
explanation might be that experienced syndicate partners are attracted to lead 
investors which have built up their own experience resulting in the emergence 
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syndicate networks of experienced VC firms, which outcompete those of 
relatively unexperienced partners. Recent work of Hopp (2010) provides some 
evidence in line with this reasoning, as his results demonstrate that greater 
industry experience is associated with more syndication. Moreover, our data 
suggest that experienced lead VCs also have access to more experienced 
syndication partners. In a post-hoc analysis, we compared the vicarious learning 
of experienced lead VCs with unexperienced lead VCs. A Wilcoxon ranksum test 
confirmed that the experienced lead VCs have significantly more trade sales in 
their syndication network than the unexperienced lead VCs. 
 
Furthermore, as we control for VC age, these results seems to suggest that it is 
not experience as such which contributes to the trade sale hazard but the specific 
knowledge a VC has with trade sales. In this respect, this study contributes to 
previous research in the VC literature, which has predominantly operationalized 
experience as age of the VC or a dummy.  We find that age of VC firms is not a 
good indicator. Certain firms might survive for a long term because they can for 
instance tap into various sorts of public money but despite their long time 
presence, they are not necessarily more likely to contribute to the trade sale 
hazard of their portfolio firms.  
 
4.7. Conclusions, practical recommendations, limitations and 
future research 
We can conclude from the analysis above that working with experienced VC firms 
is beneficial for portfolio companies aiming for a trade sale. If a VC firm has 
realized one or more trade sales before, this increases significantly the 
probability that the portfolio company will be able to realize a trade sale. The 
marginal impact of more trade sales however decreases over time. This suggests 
that working with a VC firm which has done no trade sales at all, is the most risky 
strategy for a new venture as the chances of a trade sale are then very low. 
Moreover, this relatively inexperienced VC firm might not be able to form a good 
 131 
 
syndicate (Hopp, 2010) which in turn further decreases the chances on a good 
trade sale. 
 
 Congenital learning, on the contrary, does not significantly contribute to the 
hazard of being acquired. This is in contrast with the insights gained from our 
qualitative study which suggested that the more experienced investment 
managers point to congenital learning as one of the most important learning 
forms. Although the practitioner literature suggests that experienced investment 
managers are by far more successful in securing funds, their experience does not 
seem to contribute to trade sales. We have no straightforward explanation for 
this. Potentially, our operationalization of congenital experience is too imprecise. 
Our dummy variable is an indicator of the presence of congenital experience but  
does not capture the amount of congenital experience. A better way to capture 
this might be to consider the total number or percentage of investment 
managers with prior trade sale experience (cfr. De Prijcker et al., 2011). 
  
 Regarding vicarious learning, both experienced as well as junior VCs agreed that 
this type of learning is an important source of knowledge. Furthermore, they 
pointed towards being part of and syndicating with the VC firms in the “cluster of 
the best” as the key method for maximizing vicarious input. However, when 
comparing the coefficients for experiential learning and vicarious learning, we 
notice that the contribution of experiential learning is considerably higher.  
 
The interview data we have on this subject tend to suggest that VCs do indeed 
learn from one another about methods and best practices such as converting 
loans into equity before trade sale negotiations, overviews of off balance 
liabilities to facilitate due diligences, data room disclosure and the way in which 
preferred liquidation rights with carried interest are stipulated in shareholder 
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agreements6. These best practices tend to include codified knowledge, which can 
easily be transferred. However, experiential learning seems to include a more 
tacit knowledge, which cannot easily be transferred from one VC firm to the 
other. This tacit knowledge involves business model decisions in the years after 
start-up and the way trust can be created among the various partners in the 
company. 
 
In practice however, we see that many VC firms underestimate the complexity of 
trade sales and overestimate the amount of vicarious learning they can do to 
catch up when they are lacking congenital experience at the start of the  VC firm. 
In some cases, this vicarious learning does not even take place through syndicate 
networks but is based on a much weaker form of knowledge transfer, for 
instance informal networking at symposia. The results in the paper clearly 
indicate that this form of learning will never substitute for the lack of experience.  
This is important as many government funds are set up as co-investment 
schemes with the specific objective to learn from syndicate partners rather than 
developing all the knowledge in house. Other public or university-related funds 
are only allowed to perform small investments per deal and therefore do not 
recruit experienced investment managers, but prefer to syndicate with so-called 
“experienced” partners to learn the business. The complexity of a trade sale 
seems to require many different forms of knowledge, which go far beyond the 
exchange of best practices in a typical syndicate.  
 
As any other study, also this one is fraught with a number of limitations which 
provide opportunities for further research. First, the paper only includes 
learning variables at VC firm level, ignoring the entrepreneurs’ perspective. Both 
the learning and the VC literature could benefit greatly from this kind of 
                                                          
6
 In one case, a VC told us that the preferred liquidation rights in their initial shareholder agreements 
were so aggressive that only afterwards they realized that the entrepreneurs in a potential trade sale 
would keep less than 5% of the value added, which they then had to share with the management. In a 
number of portfolio companies this had explained why the entrepreneurs were so passive in looking 
for trade sale opportunities or even neglected opportunities. 
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hierarchical analysis in which data at different levels is collected. An insight in 
the interaction of individual and firm level learning would contribute to our 
understanding of how different learning processes interact with each other. 
Second, the study includes only the measurement of trade sale as a dummy, 
ignoring the value of the trade sale. Other dependent variables such as time to 
trade sale and trade sale under- or over-pricing might be equally if not more 
important.  
 
These two limitations are certainly areas for further research which could 
contribute both to the entrepreneurship and the learning literature. Additional 
research is also needed to identify the way and mechanisms in which the 
knowledge is transferred among VC firms and among investors within the VC 
firm. Finally, more research is also required to identify the driving mechanisms of 
a trade sale and thus the type of learning that determines entrepreneurs’ and VCs’ 
success. One of the senior VCs interviewed emphasized: 
 
“The VC industry is one of the most difficult businesses. 
Around 1995-1997, we thought that we knew everything 
about this business. But then we realized we had a lot to 
learn. Today, VCs are still learning and I am continuously 
learning as well.” 
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5. Conclusions 
5.1. Conclusions and implications for management science 
5.1.1. Acquirer perspective 
The first paper used a case study design to explore how the various components of the 
acquisition process interrelate to shape the acquisition outcome. The findings indicate 
that the decisions and managerial actions taken in the search and selection phase have 
an important impact on the success of implementation. We identify search and 
involvement of the client department as crucial mechanisms in the acquisition process. 
Search is defined as the search for potential acquisition targets. It is a dynamic capability 
and involves partnering, corporate venture capital, participating in conferences etc. Our 
case study evidence demonstrates that search capabilities help the company to achieve 
acquisition success via two mechanisms: learning and trust. By engaging in partnerships 
the company gathered important technical and market information about the market it 
was about to enter. In addition, pre-acquisition collaboration with the acquisition target 
enabled a level of trust, which facilitated the further acquisition process. A second 
finding deals with the management of the selection process. From the interviews, we 
learned that involvement of the client department (i.e. the department responsible for 
the implementation of the acquisition) in the selection process is crucial for the 
following two reasons. First, it offers some valuable input with regard to estimating the 
potential synergies to be created. The client department disposes of thorough market 
knowledge necessary to estimate the future sales that could be realized with the new 
technology. Second, by involving the client department in the early stages of the 
acquisition, one creates an atmosphere of trust and co-responsibility, which is crucial for 
acquisition success. Furthermore, we discover that the interrelatedness of the different 
process components has important implications for the structure and composition of the 
team that manages the acquisition. Given that search, selection and implementation 
have an impact on one another, it is important that mechanisms are installed which 
allow the various team members involved to share and transfer knowledge.  
These results make an important contribution to the acquisition literature. Many studies 
have tried to unravel the success factors of acquisitions. While these studies are very 
informative and provide detailed insights into every aspect of the acquisition, they 
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rarely focuses on the acquisition process as a whole. To address this gap in research, we 
studied the complete acquisition process of a young technology-based firm and 
investigated how the various components of the acquisition process are interrelated and 
jointly shape acquisition process. In doing so, we not only contribute to the acquisition 
literature, but also enrich the literature on knowledge management as it provides some 
deeper insights in the learning mechanisms contributing to technology acquisition 
success.  
 
5.1.2. Perspective of young technology-based firm 
The second paper takes the perspective of the YTBF and analyzes to what extent 
managerial actions undertaken by these firms impact its likelihood of being acquired 
and its eventual acquisition return. We build on insights from resource-based theory to 
develop hypotheses on the impact of resources on acquisition likelihood and return. In a 
sample of 284 UK YTBFs, we find that patents and the hiring of experienced top 
managers result in a higher acquisition likelihood, while revenues and partnerships 
contribute to acquisition return. Our results indicate that the resources and capabilities 
which contribute to the acquisition likelihood are different from those contributing to 
acquisition return. These results seem to suggest that the resources needed to increase 
the acquisition likelihood are the resources which allow the firm to develop to a certain 
level and reach a certain level of maturity. However, some of those resources might 
become redundant once the YTBF becomes part of a larger organization. As a result they 
have no effect on acquisition return. 
These results contribute both to the entrepreneurship literature and the venture capital 
literature. The entrepreneurship literature has looked at cooperation-based 
commercialization strategies including acquisitions, but focuses predominantly on 
environmental factors influencing commercialization choice, neglecting to discuss the 
impact of managerial agency and differences in resource base. In addition, most 
entrepreneurship literature on cooperation-based commercialization strategies focuses 
on partnerships. Trade sales are rarely treated as a viable commercialization strategy. 
This paper tried to fill this gap by exploring the drivers of acquisition success from the 
perspective of the YTBF. In addition, we contribute to the venture capital literature by 
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exploring the antecedents of successful trade sales. The majority of the VC literature 
either focuses solely on IPOs or studies VC performance at portfolio level (considering 
jointly the number of IPOs and trade sales). This study on the other hand provides 
valuable insight for VCs as it helps them to advise portfolio companies to focus their 
resource building activities on those resources which are most likely to contribute to 
trade sale success. Finally, we enrich the resource-based view by illustrating the delicate 
trade-off between resources that contribute to acquisition likelihood and those that 
contribute to acquisition return. 
 
5.1.3. Perspective of venture capitalist 
The third paper finally takes the perspective of the venture capitalist and investigates 
how the venture capital firm can contribute to trade sale success. More precisely, this 
paper studies how the three various types of experience, namely experiential, congenital 
and vicarious experience, of the venture capital firm contribute to the likelihood that the 
portfolio companies of the VC will be able to realize a trade sale. Based on a survival 
analysis of 206 VC-backed UK start-ups, we find that both trade sale experience of the 
VC and learning from syndicate partners with trade sale experience significantly 
increase the trade sale hazard. The routines and procedures learned from experienced 
syndicate partners complement experience accumulated through trial and error. 
Congenital trade sale experience of the investment managers on the contrary has no 
significant influence on the acquisition hazard. By focusing on trade sales as exit route, 
these findings extend the venture capital literature. The vast majority of literature on 
venture capital exits looks at the drivers of successful IPOs (f.ex. Arthurs & Busenitz, 
2006; Gulati & Higgins, 2003; Robinson, 1999; Deeds et al., 1997), with only a few 
studies exploring trade sales as venture capital exit mechanism (f.ex. Cumming and 
MacIntosh, 2003). There is extant literature suggesting that VCs monitor and add value 
to the companies in which they invest (Sapienza et al., 1996; Knockaert et al., 2006), yet 
how the experience of the VC contributes the likelihood of portfolio companies realizing 
an exit by trade sale is an area which is still unexplored.  Using arguments from learning 
theory to hypothesize the relation between vicarious, experiential and congenital 
learning of the venture capital (VC) firm and the trade sale hazard of its portfolio 
companies, this paper addressed this gap. In addition, this paper contributes to 
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entrepreneurship literature, as it informs how the experience of the venture capitalist 
could help the young technology-based firm to accomplish an acquisition as a 
cooperation-based commercialization strategy. 
 
5.2. Conclusions and implications for management practice 
Besides the contributions to management science, this doctoral dissertation also 
generated some interesting insights for management practice. As all three parties 
involved in the acquisition process are studied, this dissertation provides some 
guidelines for the acquirer, as well as the young technology-based firm and the venture 
capitalist.  
The first paper mainly provides some practical guidelines for acquirers. A first 
recommendation involves the search process preceding acquisitions. Our insights 
suggest that search is a crucial component of technology acquisitions. It allows the 
acquirer to become acquainted with the future acquisition target and gain some valuable 
insights with respect to the technology owned by the target and the market. As such, 
well-developed search strategies provide a window and technology and help the 
acquirer to adequately value and select potential acquisition targets, thereby reducing 
the risk of a misfit between acquirer and target. A second advantage of search relates to 
the development of a relationship with future acquisition targets. Collaboration with 
future acquisition targets allows both parties to develop a mutual supporting 
relationship fostering trust. The trust built during the collaboration might become 
valuable when the collaboration evolves into an acquisition. Potentially it reduces the 
resistance that might exist with the target against the acquisition, leading to a smoother 
implementation. Furthermore, it contributes to a more friendly atmosphere during the 
negotiations. Together, these findings suggest that companies which seek to 
complement their internal innovation strategy with technology acquisitions, should 
establish appropriate search processes which provide the company with a window on 
new technologies as well as more detailed information when open-ended search 
practices evolves towards more committed collaborations with future targets. A second 
recommendation relates to the involvement of the client department. Our case study 
suggests that involvement of the client department in the selection stage is beneficial for 
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acquisition performance for two reasons. On the one hand, it helps the acquirer to 
adequately select and value acquisition target by combining the insights on the market 
of both the acquirer and the target. On the other hand, it also helps to secure buy-in and 
commitment from the department who will be responsible for the implementation as it 
creates a sense of involvement and co-responsibility. This has important implications for 
the team responsible for the complete acquisition. Measures should be taken to 
guarantee that the team responsible for the management of the acquisition involves all 
parties involved, though their role will change as the acquisition process evolves. While 
this study focuses on the perspective of the acquirer, also young technology-based firms 
can learn from this. For example, it might be beneficial for young technology-based firms 
seeking to be acquired, to enter in collaborations with potential acquirers. This does not 
only help them to create visibility among future acquirers but also may lead to a better 
commercialization of their technology.  
The second and the third paper in contrast provide some insight that better serve the 
interest of the seller. Companies seeking to be acquired by an incumbent in possession 
of the complementary assets necessary to bring their product to the market should 
consider the following. Regarding the resources and capabilities contributing to trade 
sale success, our results suggest that different resources and capabilities contribute to 
acquisition likelihood and acquisition return. Factors contributing to acquisition 
likelihood are hiring experienced top managers, protecting the technology by patents 
and attracting venture capital from VCs with trade sale experience. Factors contributing 
to acquisition return are establishing partnerships –both commercial and research 
partnerships and the amount of revenues. These results suggest that in order to become 
an acquisition target, young technology-based firms should have reached a certain level 
of maturity and provide proof of commercial viability. These insights are not only useful 
for the young technology-based firm, also the venture capital firm benefits from these 
insights, as it helps them to evaluate potential investees and focus their value-adding 
activities at those actions which are most likely to contribute to trade sale success. 
Finally, also policy makers benefit from these insights as it allows them to better grasp 
the factors contributing to a successful commercialization of technology which in turn 
might shape future policy with respect to young technology-based firm that are partly 
funded by government and academic spin-offs. Furthermore, these findings underline 
the importance of the experience of the venture capitalist with realizing exits. This is 
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something that should be considered when setting up new venture capital funds funded 
by the government. However, the question remains to what extent are technology 
acquisitions an interesting objective from policy perspective. Many of these young 
technology-based ventures are acquired by company from abroad which leads to the 
question “to what extend do nations still benefit from their innovations when they are 
acquired by foreign companies?”. This issue should definitely be considered in further 
research, which brings me to the final point of this thesis.  
 
5.3. Avenues for further research 
As any doctoral dissertation, this study not only provided answers to research question 
posed but also led to some additional research questions and avenues for future 
research. With respect to the first paper, additional research is needed to test whether 
the propositions hold in various contexts. Furthermore, more research is required to 
further disentangle the search process. To our knowledge, this is the first paper that 
specifically investigates the search process preceding acquisition. Further research 
could for instance pose the questions whether search strategies are adequate under all 
circumstances and whether or not it might slow down the acquisition process leading to 
lost opportunities. Knowledge management in the context of acquisitions is also an area 
for further research. More research is needed to unravel how knowledge is transferred 
between the various parties involved in the acquisition process and which practices 
work under which circumstances.  
The second paper inspired the following research questions. First, it might be 
interesting to explore the resources and capabilities necessary to realize a successful 
trade sale longitudinally. This would provide some very interesting insights with respect 
to the various steps young technology-based firms should take in order to be acquired, 
as well as the optimal time-to-exit. Furthermore, it would be interesting to see whether 
there are differences between sectors and industries. For instance, it might be that in 
sectors with a clear route to commercialization and guaranteed market acceptance (such 
as many biotech firms), developing a technology for which the technological risk has 
been minimized is sufficient to realize a successful exit. While in other sectors where the 
route to commercialization is less clear, young technology-based firms should take their 
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company one step further along the company life cycle and also provide proof of market 
acceptance with early adopters or even the mainstream market.  
The third paper finally instigated following avenues for further research. Our evidence 
indicate that trade sale experience of the VC is important for realizing trade sales. This 
raises the question whether the experience of the entrepreneur could also contribute to 
trade sale success. In addition, it might also be interesting to study how individual level 
learning and organizational level learning interact, considering both the experience of 
the entrepreneurs and the venture capitalists. Furthermore, it would be fascinating to 
differentiate between success experiences and failure experience. Finally, additional 
research could shed some light on how experiences are shared within and across 
organization boundaries.  
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